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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, scholars and practitioners have struggled to define the
political concept generally referred to as democracy. That exasperation in
seeking a definition for democracy is evidenced in Schweinitz’s statement that
“[d]emocracy is one of those troublesome words which means all things to all
people.”1 He continues and states that “[l]ike motherhood and patriotism, [democracy] is thought to be a noble condition and so is evoked by politicians,
publicists, preachers, and demagogues to prove their unsullied intentions and
just claim to popular support.”2 Part of the reason for the confusion in what
democracy really is, is derived, at least partly, from the way the word is used,
particularly by politicians who seek to convince their citizens, as well as the
global society that their countries are bastions of democracy. For example,
during the existence of East Germany (1949–1990), which was part of the
Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, the country was often referred to as the German Democratic Republic. Then, there are today’s Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is difficult
to find any institution or organization that studies democracy and democratic
governments that would consider any of these countries as democratic or as
possessing fully functioning democratic institutions.3
Certain values and characteristics have the power to make, break or define
a democracy. Adherence or fidelity to the rule of law is one of them and it is
an important foundation on which democracy is built; it is not only the heart
and soul of a democratic society, but without it, members of society would
find it very difficult to live together peacefully. For example, in Africa, in
order to effectively manage the conflicting interests of the diverse subcultures
that inhabit each country, “all citizens, regardless of their political, economic,
and ethnocultural affiliation, must be subject to the law.”4 Regardless of what
an African country calls itself, it cannot be said to be democratic or practicing
democratic governance if the majority of its citizens consider themselves
above the law or do not voluntarily adhere to the rule of law. A governing
process characterized or undergirded by the rule of law is the key to peaceful
coexistence and development in Africa. Such a governing process is also the
foundation on which a democracy is built.
During the last several decades, many African countries have suffered
from a variety of political and economic problems. Some of these problems
1
KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR., INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC
NECESSITIES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 12 (1964).
2
Id.
3
See John Mukum Mbaku, Corruption and Democratic Institutions in Africa, 27
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 310, 331 (2018).
4
John Mukum Mbaku, Kenyan Democracy and the Rule of Law, GEO. J. INT’L AFF.
(March 28, 2018), https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition
/2018/3/28/kenyan-democracy-and-the-rule-of-law.
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include, but are not limited to, government impunity; military intervention in
politics; extreme poverty, especially among historically vulnerable groups
(e.g., women, infants and children; ethnic and religious minorities); ethnicinduced violence, some of which has deteriorated into civil wars; massive
abuse of human rights, including genocide and ethnic cleansing; abuse and
exploitation of children, including their use (i) in the production of pornography, (ii) as “child soldiers” in various conflicts, (iii) “slaves” in fetish shrines
or beggars on the streets of various cities, (iv) as sources of organs for the
international organ transplantation market, (v) sexual slaves in the sex-tourism industry; and many more.5
True, African countries have a lot of political and economic problems.
Nevertheless, they also have the potential to deal fully and effectively with all
of them. Take extreme poverty, for example. Available data show that in 2018,
as many as 91.16 million people in Nigeria were living in extreme poverty.6
In June 2018, researchers at the Washington, D.C.-based think tank, The
Brookings Institution, determined that Nigeria had overtaken India as the
country with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty in the
world.7 By 2030, the number of Nigerians living in extreme poverty is expected to rise to 120 million, representing 45.5% of the national population.8
Even though Nigeria is one of the countries with the highest population of
people living in extreme poverty, Nigeria is also endowed with significant
amounts of natural resources, including large reserves of oil and gas.9 Since
the 1970s, the country has received significant amounts of revenues from the
export of its natural resources.10 These revenues could have been invested by
the government in public programs that are pro-poor and capable of providing

5

See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, The Rule of Law and the Exploitation of Children in
Africa, 42 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 287, 287 (2019) (examining conditions leading
to the abuse and exploitation of children in Africa); see generally John Mukum Mbaku,
International Law and the Struggle Against Government Impunity in Africa, 42 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 73 (2019) (examining the persistence of government impunity in
Africa and how to eradicate it) [hereinafter Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity].
6
See Emmanuel Okogba, 91 Million Nigerians Now Live in Extreme Poverty—World
Poverty Clock, VANGUARD (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/02/91-mi
llion-nigerians-now-live-in-extreme-poverty-world-poverty-clock/.
7
Homi Kharas, Kristofer Hamel & Martin Hofer, The Start of a New Narrative,
BROOKINGS INST. (June 19, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2
018/06/19/the-start-of-a-new-poverty-narrative/; see also Yomi Kazeem, Nigeria Has Become the Poverty Capital of the World, QUARTZ AFRICA (June 25, 2018), https://qz.com/afr
ica/1313380/nigerias-has-the-highest-rate-of-extreme-poverty-globally/.
8
The Percentage of Nigerians Living in Extreme Poverty Could Increase by 2030,
WORLD POVERTY CLOCK (2018), https://worldpoverty.io/blog/index.php?r=12.
9
Ruth Maclean, Violence in Cameroon’s Anglophone Regions ‘Spiraling Out of Control,’ GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/18/camer
oon-amnesty-election-violence-anglophone-regions.
10
Id.
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those living in extreme poverty with the opportunity for self-actualization. So,
why did Nigerian authorities not devote these enormous revenues to povertyalleviation efforts? In an interview in 2012, former World Bank Vice President Dr. Oby Ezekwesili, herself a Nigerian and co-founder of Transparency
International (the Berlin-based anti-corruption non-governmental organization), indicated that Nigeria had “lost more than $400 billion to oil thieves
since she attained independence in 1960.”11 Dr. Ezekwesili went on to say that
“as much as 20 percent of the entire budget for capital expenditure in Nigeria
ended in private pockets annually” and noted that “whereas oil accounts for
about 90 percent of the value of Nigeria’s exports, over 80 percent of the fund
ends up in the hands of one percent of the country’s population.”12 In other
words, extreme poverty in Nigeria is not due to the fact that the country does
not have the resources to deal with it. The problem lies in the fact that, over
the years, the country’s civil servants and political elites have squandered and
mismanaged the resources that could have been used to invest in human development. As stated by Antony Goldman:
Nigeria has earned around $400bn from oil since 1970. A Nigerian friend returning home after 15 years abroad asked
where the war had been—so run down and dilapidated had the
country become. And yet Nigerians own some of the finest
properties in the world’s best cities, and swell some of the
world’s biggest bank accounts.13
Nigeria, of course, is not the only African country that has squandered its
development potential through bureaucratic and other forms of corruption.
During the last several decades, countries such as Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and, of course, Nigeria, have received significant revenues from the sale of oil but virtually all of these revenues have “been squandered and fritted away in conspicuous consumption” by a few privileged civil
servants and political elites, leaving significant numbers of citizens sweltering
in extreme poverty.14
Many studies have been devoted to determining why several African countries, including even those with significant endowments of natural and human
resources, have failed to improve the quality of life for their citizens. Some of
the reasons advanced to explain the continued existence of a major
11

See Ikechukwu Nnochiri, Nigeria Loses $400 Bn to Oil Thieves—Ezekwesili,
VANGUARD (Aug. 28, 2012), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/08/nigeria-loses-400bnto-oil-thieves-ezekwesili/.
12
Id.
13
Antony Goldman, Who Benefits from Africa’s Oil? BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2004), http://n
ews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3542901.stm.
14
See GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, AFRICA UNCHAINED: THE BLUEPRINT FOR AFRICA’S
FUTURE 34 (2005).
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underdevelopment trap in many African countries characterized by huge
pockets of extreme poverty, include: (1) the pervasive nature of bureaucratic
and political corruption; (2) the failure of many of these countries to effectively manage diversity, which has allowed a majority faction15 to tyrannize
minority ethnic and religious groups; (3) violent and destructive mobilization
by subcultures that have been marginalized or perceive themselves to be marginalized by public policies—in some countries, this mobilization has deteriorated into civil wars;16 (4) unmanageable external debts; (5) continued dependence of African countries on their former colonizers for trade,
development, and food aid; (6) intervention by the military in national politics; (7) a global market that discriminates against African business interests;

15
Such a faction is usually made up of one or more ethnocultural groups that monopolize
and control the political system, as well as major sectors of the economy. In doing so, such
a majority faction marginalizes the minority and forces the latter to live in extreme poverty
on the economic margins. For example, since unification between the English-speaking
and French-speaking regions of the erstwhile German colony of Kamerun in 1961, the
country’s government has been dominated by the Francophones. The latter have controlled
the political and economic systems of the Republic of Cameroon, to the exclusion of the
country’s Anglophone Regions. In late-2016, teachers and lawyers in the Anglophone Regions took to the streets to peacefully protest the continued marginalization of the Anglophones. The central government responded to the peaceful protests with extreme brutality,
killing thousands of people and burning down more than 300 Anglophone villages. As a
consequence, radical Anglophone groups responded to the central government’s violence
with violence of their own. As of this writing (2020), the country is embroiled in a bloody
and “genocidal” conflict that is being compared to the Rwanda Genocide of 1994. See, e.g.,
Kwasi Gyamfi Asiedu & Commentary, Cameroon’s “Quiet” Anglophone Crisis Keeps
Escalating with Killings, Detentions Mounting, QUARTZ AFRICA (May 29, 2018), https://qz
.com/africa/1291273/cameroons-anglophone-activists-say-unreported-killings-like-rwand
a-genocide/ (arguing that activists in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon are now comparing the massacre of thousands of Anglophones and the burning of their villages by government security forces to the Rwanda Genocide of 1994); see also John Mukum Mbaku,
International Law and the Anglophone Problem in Cameroon: Federalism, Secession or
the Status Quo?, 42 SUFFOLK TRANSNT’L L. REV. 1 (2019) (examining the violent struggle
between the Anglophones and the Francophone-dominated central government in Cameroon).
16
Recent examples include civil wars or ethnic-induced violence in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan. See generally Maclean, supra note 9 (examining
the violence between Anglophone separatists and the central government that has degenerated into the slaughter of thousands of civilians and the burning of many villages); Morgan Winsor, South Sudan Marks 5 Years of Vicious Civil War, ABC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2018),
https://abcnews.go.com/International/south-sudan-marks-years-vicious-civil-war/story?id
=59797433 (noting that the civil war that started in South Sudan in 2013 remains quite
active); Ewelina U. Ochab, The Religious War in the Central African Republic Continues,
FORBES (May 9, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2018/05/09/the-religi
ous-war-in-central-african-republic-continues/#19746c2f3c0d (noting the fighting between religious militias—mainly Muslim and Christian—in the Central African Republic).
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(8) excessive and unmanageable population growth; and (9) a chronic shortage of physical and human capital.17
In addition, it has been argued that “pervasive poverty in the continent is
due either to mistakes made by well-intentioned policymakers or to the ineptitude and incompetence of poorly educated and unskilled civil servants and
politicians.”18 It has been argued, then, by some development economists, that
emphasis should be placed “on the recruitment into the public services of African countries, new leaders who are better trained and educated, have higher
skills, and are more honest and disciplined, and have higher levels of integrity.”19
Research conducted during the last several decades, however, has shown
that many of the “so-called policy mistakes committed in the African countries during the last several years were actually deliberate programs designed
and advanced by opportunistic—but not necessarily poorly informed or unskilled—politicians and civil servants seeking ways to enrich themselves at
the expense of the rest of society.”20 In fact, research has determined that in
many African countries, “civil servants actually intentionally and deliberately
impose various bottlenecks where none existed before with the expectation
that entrepreneurs, afraid that these bottlenecks would increase their transaction costs, would be willing to bribe the regulators to have them removed.”21
In a study of corruption in Africa, B. Osei-Hwedei and K. Osei-Hwedei determined that “when bottlenecks are created in the administration [i.e., government] within the sectors dealing with the public, they become a source of
corruption”22 used by civil servants to extort money for themselves. In doing
so, civil servants stunt economic growth and create an environment for the
perpetuation of poverty, especially among historically vulnerable groups,
such as women, youth, and religious and ethnic minorities.
But, how were these state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political
elites) able to undertake these perverse public policies without any pushback
from civil society and its organizations? First, since independence, many African countries have not been able to provide themselves with governing processes that adequately constrain the state and guard the government against

17
See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 236–40
(2004).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and the Fight Against Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 661, 680 n. 94 (2016).
22
See Bertha Z. Osei-Hwedie & Kwaku Osei-Hwedie, The Political, Economic, and
Cultural Bases of Corruption in Africa, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA:
LESSONS FROM COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES 40, 44 (Kempe R. Hope, Sr. & Bornwell C.
Chikulo eds., 2000).

300

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L

[Vol. 48:293

such behaviors as corruption and rent seeking.23 In fact, the laws and institutions that many African countries adopted at independence actually created
imperial presidencies and empowered many politicians and civil servants with
significant levels of discretion, which they used to plunder national resources
for their own benefit and that of their supporters, the majority of whom are
usually members of the subculture to whom the politician or civil servant belongs.24
Second, in several countries, military elites intervened in politics, claiming
that they intended to save their countries from incompetent and opportunistic
civilian governors.25 For example, when the military overthrew the government of Nigeria’s First Republic in 1966, one of the coup leaders, Major C.
Kaduna Nzeogwu, claimed that they had done so in order to save Nigerians
and their hard-fought independence from the “tribalists” and “nepotists” who
had squandered the country’s development potential through their corrupt activities.26 He went on to state that the military wanted to assure “every law
abiding citizen [of Nigeria] . . . freedom from fear and all forms of oppression,
freedom from general inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field
of human endeavor, both nationally and internationally.”27
Nigeria’s coup leaders, as was the case with their counterparts in other
African countries, did not keep their promises. Instead, they plundered their
economies for their personal benefit, abused the rights of their fellow citizens,
and promoted policies that stunted economic growth and development, as well
any efforts to institutionalize the rule of law and constitutional government.28
The Nigerian military, which ruled the country during the periods 1966–1979
and 1993–1999, committed many atrocities against their fellow citizens.29
23
John Mukum Mbaku, Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Futility of Cleanups,
16 CATO J. 99, 100 (Spring/Summer 1996).
24
For example, since Paul Biya became President of the Republic of Cameroon in 1982,
his Beti/Bulu ethnic group from the South Region of the country has held most of the key
senior positions in government and dominate “state-owned businesses, and security
forces.” See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2018 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES:
CAMEROON (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-huma
n-rights-practices/cameroon.
25
See, e.g., Victor T. Le Vine, The Fall and Rise of Constitutionalism in West Africa,
35 J. MOD. AFRI. STUD. 181 (1997) (examining the impact of military coups on constitutionalism in several countries in West Africa).
26
See Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Announcing Nigeria’s First Military Coup
on Radio Niger (Jan. 15, 1966), reprinted in VANGUARD (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.van
guardngr.com/2010/09/radio-broadcast-by-major-chukwuma-kaduna-nzeogwu-%E2%80
%93-announcing-nigeria%E2%80%99s-first-military-coup-on-radio-nigeria-kaduna-on-j
anuary-15-1966/.
27
Id.
28
See, e.g., Claire Felter, Africa’s ‘Leaders for Life’, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr.
29, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/africas-leaders-life.
29
How First Coup Still Haunts Nigeria 50 Years On, BBC NEWS (Jan. 15, 2016), https://
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Despite the claim that their more disciplined training would make them more
effective governors, their reign was marked by extremely high levels of selfdealing, public financial malpractices, abuse of fundamental rights, and a significant level of tyranny directed at civilians.30
Of course, Nigeria was not the only country in Africa whose military had
taken over control of the government. On July 23, 1952, the government of
King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown by members of the Free Officers
Movement.31 Since the 1952 military intervention in the country’s political
system, Africa has encountered “at least 200 successful and failed coups.”32
However, by the mid-1990s
especially after South Africa’s successful transition from the
racially-based apartheid system to a multi-racial and democratic political dispensation, many Africans came to see multiparty democracy and constitutionalism as the only legitimate
way to change government, as well as to enhance and ensure
peaceful coexistence and minimize sectarian conflict.33
However, the continent has continued to suffer from military intervention in
politics.34
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35312370.
30
No event illustrates the cruelty and the recklessness of military rule in Nigeria more
than the brutal execution of Ken Saro Wiwa, a human rights activist and leader of the
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni Peoples (MOSOP) and eight other Ogoni activists.
See, e.g., Ifeanyi O. Onwuazombe, Human Rights Abuse and Violations in Nigeria: A Case
Study of the Oil-Producing Communities in the Niger Delta Region, 22 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 123 (2017) (examining the execution, by the military, of the
human rights activist, Ken Saro Wiwa).
31
See JOEL GORDON, NASSER’S BLESSED MOVEMENT: EGYPT’S FREE OFFICERS AND THE
JULY REVOLUTION 4 (1992) (examining the Egyptian military coup of 1952 and its aftermath).
32
See Yomi Kazeem, What is a Coup? These 40 African Countries Could Help Explain,
QUARTZ AFRICA (Nov. 16, 2017), https://qz.com/africa/1130009/what-is-coup-zimbabwejoins-40-african-countries-that-have-had-coups/.
33
John Mukum Mbaku, Constitutional Coups as a Threat to Democratic Governance
in Africa, 2 INT’L COMP., POL’Y & ETHICS L. REV. 77, 90 (2018). It was this belief in multiparty democracy as a method for change of government that provided the impetus for the
adoption of the adoption of the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to
Unconstitutional Changes of Government (hereinafter “Lomé Declaration”). The Lomé
Declaration specifically rejected the military coup as a way to change the government. See
Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, Lomé, Togo, July 10–12, 2000, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI).
34
Recent coups in Africa include: Burkina Faso (2014), Egypt (2013), Sudan (2019),
and Zimbabwe (2018). See generally What Was Behind the Coup in Burkina Faso?, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34277045; Eliza Mackintosh, Zimbabwe’s Military Takeover was the World’s Strangest Coup, CNN (Nov. 21,
2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/20/africa/zimbabwe-military-takeover-strangest-co
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Le Vine has argued that of all the efforts to thwart or stunt the practice of
constitutional government and the rule of law in Africa, the military coup
d’état has been the most effective. He argued that military intervention in African politics and the subsequent establishment of military regimes “epitomized the low estate to which constitutionalism had fallen during the 1963–
89” period in Africa.35 He argued further that:
[n]ot only did they [i.e., the military regimes] commit acts
which in themselves amply spoke to their disdain of the rule
of law, but after taking power, they frequently suspended or
discarded existing constitutions, to be removed from sight as
offensive remnants of previous régimes, and then (more often
than not in order to help legitimize their own rule) proceeded
to write new ones to suit themselves.36
Third, even in countries where there have not been successful military
coups, peace and security have still been threatened.37 For example, South
Sudan, one of the world’s and Africa’s youngest country, has been pervaded
by ethnic-induced violence during most of its existence as an independent
country.38 Violent mobilization by ethnic-based militias plunged the country
into civil war in 2013 and as of this writing, the country has still not been able
to extricate itself from this bloody confrontation.39 Not only has the continued
violence in South Sudan crippled the economy but it has uprooted thousands
of people, especially women and children, and created a hunger crisis that has
put millions of citizens in danger of starvation.40
In May 2015, there was a failed coup in Burundi.41 The attempted coup
took place during the mass unrest that followed the announcement by the
country’s president, Pierre Nkurunziza, that he would seek a third term in office even though he was constitutionally barred from doing so.42 Yet, despite
its failure, tensions between President Nkurunziza’s ethnic Hutu majority and
the Tutsi minority continued, forcing thousands of citizens, many Tutsi, to
up/index.html; Sudan Coup: Why Omar al-Bashir Was Overthrown, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47852496.
35
Le Vine, supra note 25, at 190.
36
Id.
37
See Winsor, supra note 16.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Megan Specia & Kassie Bracken, In South Sudan, a Never-Ending Hunger Season
Puts Millions in Danger, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/3
0/world/africa/south-sudan-hunger-season.html.
41
Aryn Baker, Attempted Coup in Burundi Fails But Tensions Linger, TIME (May 15,
2015), http://time.com/3859920/burundis-attempted-coup-fails/.
42
Id.
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seek refuge in Rwanda.43 It has been four years since the violence started but
it has not yet abated as Nkurunziza and his fellow ethnics continue to dominate and control the government.44 In fact, in 2018, the country’s constitution
was amended to significantly increase President Nkurunziza’s powers and allow him to potentially remain in office until 2034.45
Fourth, in countries with imperial or reinforced presidencies, executives
abused their powers and engaged in activities that stunted human development, exacerbated inter-ethnic conflicts, failed to promote and enhance national integration and nation-building, and derailed any efforts to deepen and
institutionalize democratic governance. As argued by Le Vine, these reinforced presidencies were found in “Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, and Cameroon.”46 In these countries, “elected legislative assemblies
tended to be relegated to the role of a prebendiary pasturage, and their members usually gave automatic assent to the initiatives of the ‘reinforced’ presidencies.”47 The results of Le Vine’s research were published in 1997.48 Yet,
as of this writing, these imperial presidencies remain and they continue to
wield virtually unchecked or unguarded power.49 In a book published in 2006
listing the world’s twenty worst living dictators, eight were in Africa and included Paul Biya of Cameroon, the late Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya, and
the late Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.50
43

Id.
Id.
45
See Burundi Backs New Constitution Extending Presidential Term Limits, AL
JAZEERA (May 22, 2018), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2018/05/burundi-backsconstitution-extending-presidential-term-limits-180521134736408.html.
46
See Le Vine, supra note 25, at 189.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Charles Manga Fombad and Enyinna Nwauche, experts on constitutionalism in Africa, argue that despite the constitutional amendments that took place in Cameroon in 1996,
“the purported separation of powers [remains] purely symbolic” and the President of the
Republic continues to dominate the legislature and control the judiciary. Charles Manga
Fombad & Enyinna Nwauche, Africa’s Imperial Presidents: Immunity, Impunity and Accountability, 5 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 96 (2012).
50
DAVID WALLECHINSKY, TYRANTS: THE WORLD’S 20 WORST DICTATORS (2006) (listing and examining the world’s twenty worst dictators). Qaddafi was killed during Libya’s
civil war, which started in 2011; Biya remains the president of the Republic of Cameroon—
in fact, he was re-elected for a seventh term in elections held in 2018; and Mugabe was
ousted by military coup in 2017. See, e.g., Eyong Blaise & Bukola Adebayo, Cameroon’s
Paul Biya Wins Seventh Term in Office, CNN (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/
10/22/world/africa/cameroon-paul-biya-gets-seventh-term/index.html; Bill Chappell, Zimbabwe’s Mugabe Out of Power for First Time Since 1980s as Military Takes Control, NPR
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/15/564320495/zimba
Bwes-mugabe-is-out-of-power-for-first-time-since-1980s-military-denies-coup; Peter
Beaumont & Chris Stephen, Gaddafi’s Last Words as he Begged for Mercy: ‘What Did I
Do to You?’, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/23/
44
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Finally, in recent years, the constitutional coup has emerged as a major
threat to “democratic institutions and individual liberty, as well as peaceful
coexistence in the continent” [of Africa].51 But, what is the constitutional
coup? It involves the amendment of the constitution either to eliminate presidential term limits or other constraints (e.g., age limits or citizenship requirements) on the ability of the incumbent president to extend his or her mandate.52 The constitutional coup can also involve the situation in which
incumbent presidents amend or have the constitution amended to “invalidate
the candidacies of their opponents, weaken the opposition, and guarantee regime survival.”53
In countries such as Cameroon, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda, incumbent
presidents have been able to change their constitutions, with the help of a
compliant legislature, to remain in power indefinitely.54 In 2008, Paul Biya,
who had been President of the Republic of Cameroon since 1982 and was
constitutionally prohibited from running for another term in office, had a compliant parliament amend the constitution to clear the way for him to stand for
another term in office.55 After the constitution was amended, Biya ran for reelection in the 2011 presidential election and won another seven year term in
office with 77.99% of the vote.56 Most Cameroonians believed that he would
step down after that term, having served 36 years in office.57 However, at the
end of his term in 2018, he refused to leave office and again stood for another
term.58 In an election marred by violence and the failure of voters in the country’s two Anglophone Regions to participate, Biya emerged as the winner and
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is expected to remain in office until at least 2025, at which time, he would
have been president of Cameroon continuously for forty-three years.59
Studies of extreme poverty and underdevelopment in Africa now point to
the absence or lack of governing processes that guarantee the rule of law as
the main obstacle to peaceful coexistence and the creation of the wealth that
the African countries need to deal fully and effectively with the various types
of poverty.60 The behaviors listed above, such as military and constitutional
coups, as well as high levels of corruption, are “manifestations of non-democratic governance systems.”61 In each of these African countries, the people,
through their governments, have failed to provide themselves with governing
processes undergirded by the rule of law. In fact, a governing process that
guarantees the rule of law is also one that effectively constrains the state and
guards against government impunity, majoritarian tyranny, and other forms of
political opportunism that have exacerbated inter-ethnic conflict and stunted
human development in many African countries.62
E. A. Brett, a scholar of African political economy, has argued that the
causes of extreme poverty and economic regression in Africa during the last
several decades “are clearly structural rather than contingent, since breakdown is almost universal and cannot simply be attributed to particular national
circumstances.”63 He continued that the causes of underdevelopment and extreme poverty in Africa “must stem from the nature of the institutional arrangements developed under colonialism and hastily modified during the political transition of the 1950s and 1960s.”64
As argued by the late Douglass C. North,65 the Noble Laureate in economics, “it is the success and failures in human organization that account for the
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progress and retrogression of societies.”66 Hence, the most important public
policy priority for each African country is to make certain it has a governing
process that adequately constrains the state and guards the government against
the abuse of power. In other words, to enhance peaceful coexistence, eradicate
extreme poverty, and promote human development, each African country
must provide itself with a governing process undergirded by the rule of law.
For, without adherence or fidelity to the rule of law, peace and security will
be threatened, and there would be a general failure for countries to create the
wealth that they need to confront extreme poverty and significantly improve
the people’s quality of life. In the African countries, the rule of law is very
important for stability and development.
II. WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW?
A. Introduction
Throughout the years, many legal and constitutional scholars have contributed to the definition of the rule of law.67 Among these scholars, British legal
philosopher Albert Venn Dicey is one of the most important.68 The rule of law
is “typically contrasted with arbitrary exercise of power.”69 The rule of law is
supposed to “eliminate arbitrariness in the exercise of power,”70 a problem
that is pervasive throughout many African countries.71 It has been argued that,
despite the differences in how scholars and practitioners perceive the meaning
of the rule of law, “the leading judicial and academic authorities on the rule
of law subscribe to a common idea of the meaning of the principle. This core
meaning is simply that the rule of law requires that individuals be protected
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from arbitrary government.”72 E. C. S. Wade, in his “Introduction” to Dicey’s
Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution,73 argued that while
“the rule of law must not be conceived of as being linked to any particular
technique,” it is important and “fundamental that there must exist some technique for forcing the Government to submit to the law.”74 He continued and
stated that “if such a technique does not exist, the Government itself becomes
the means whereby the law is achieved. This is the antithesis of the rule of
law.”75 In other words, the law must be supreme.
Wade reminded readers that “[t]here is no doubt that arbitrary power is today resented and feared to an even greater extent than in the late nineteenth
century in those States which retain their faith in a democratic form of government.”76 Thus, Wade continued, criticisms of some aspects of Dicey’s
work “have been superseded by a revival of interest in the conception of the
rule of law as being the antithesis to the arbitrary and despotic forms of government”77—these, of course, include those which, since the 1950s and 1960s,
came into being in Africa. Finally, Wade provided a summary of what is today
the general or common understanding of the concept of the rule of law:
The rule of law presupposes the absence of arbitrary power
and so gives the assurance that the individual can ascertain
with reasonable certainty what legal powers are available to
government if there is a proposal to affect his private rights. A
person who takes the trouble to consult his lawyer ought to be
able to ascertain the legal consequences of his own acts and
what are the powers of others to interfere with those acts.78
In his study of the law of the constitution, Dicey argued that an effective
definition of the rule of law must embody three very important principles: (1)
the law is supreme; (2) all citizens, regardless of their economic, political, or
social position, are equal before the law; and (3) the rights of individuals,
which are established through court decisions, must be accepted and respected.79 Other scholars have since made additional contributions to defining
and explaining the principle of the rule of law. For example, the late Rt. Hon.
Lord Bingham of Cornhill KG, House of Lords, a well-respected and
72
Patrick J. Monahan, Is the Pearson Airport Legislation Unconstitutional?: The Rule
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429 (1995).
73
See DICEY, supra note 68, at cx.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at cx–cxi.
79
Id. at 201–202.

308

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L

[Vol. 48:293

distinguished British jurist and legal scholar, argued that “the core of the existing principle” of the rule of law is that “all persons and authorities within
the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the
benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts.”80
Some legal scholars have argued, however, that to effectively define the
rule of law, one must distinguish between formal and substantive definitions.81 Craig Stern argues that “[f]ormal definitions of the rule of law speak
to the rules that are designed to constrain civil government and the courts.”82
Substantive definitions of the rule of law, on the other hand, concern the extent
to which these rules “embody principles of justice such as human rights.”83
The late Anglo-Austrian economist and philosopher, Friedrich August von
Hayek, provided a formal definition of the rule when he stated that:
Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under the arbitrary government than
the observance in the former of the great principles known as
the Rule of Law. Stripped of all technicalities this means that
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee
with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs
on the basis of this knowledge. Though this ideal can never be
perfectly achieved, since legislators as well as those to whom
the administration of the law is [e]ntrusted are fallible men, the
essential point, that the discretion left to the executive organs
wielding coercive power should be reduced as much as possible, is clear enough. While every law restricts individual freedom to some extent by altering the means which people may
use in the pursuit of their aims, under the Rule of Law the government is prevented from stultifying individual efforts by ad
hoc action. Within the known rules of the game the individual
is free to pursue his personal ends and desires, certain that the

80
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powers of government will not be used deliberately to frustrate
his efforts.84
Von Hayek’s definition of the rule of law is formal because “it prescribes
how law should operate generally rather than prescribing any particular content of the law.”85 According to this formal definition of the rule of law, “there
is law formally enacted, and both state custodians (that is, government officials)86 and citizens are bound by and must abide by that law.”87 Professor
Robert Stein argues that the most critical aspect of the rule of law is that “the
law is superior, applies equally, is known and predictable, and is administered
through a separation of powers.”88
Where the rule of law functions properly, “no one, including senior civil
servants and politicians, is above the law.”89 Thus, in such a society, all citizens, “regardless of their economic and political status, are bound by and subject to the law.”90 This principle is very important, especially for countries in
Africa where some people or population groups (e.g., Whites or people of
European ancestry in apartheid South Africa; members of the ruling majority
faction in several countries, like Cameroon) consider (or historically have
considered) themselves above the law. Hence, for each African country, adherence or fidelity to the rule of law implies that “one’s ethnic or racial . . .
status should not have any bearing on how the law treats them—all persons
are subject to the law and all persons are equal before the law.”91
While the law must generally be known and understood by the people, it
must also apply equally to all citizens, and in addition “must be that which the
people can obey.”92 According to U.S. suffragist and women’s advocate, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, “[t]o make laws that man can not and will not obey,
serves to bring all law into contempt. It is very important in a republic, that
the people should respect the laws, for if we throw them to the winds, what
becomes of civil government?”93 Of course, in order for the rule of law to
function properly and effectively, “there must be available mechanisms and
84
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institutions that have the capacity to enforce the legal rules when they are
breached, regardless of who breaches them.”94
The substantive definition of the rule of law, unlike its formal counterpart,
constrains the content of law. For example, Thomas Carothers argues:
The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws
are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally
to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political and civil
liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over
the last half-century. In particular, anyone accused of a crime
has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent
until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system,
including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair,
competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps
most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be
applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be
law-abiding.95
Carothers expanded the formal approach to the definition of the rule of law
to link it to and emphasize the protection of human rights. With respect to
African countries, it is important that national laws and constitutions96 accord
with the provisions of international human rights instruments.97 But, why the
emphasis on linking national constitutions and laws to the provisions of international human rights instruments? It has been argued that “the need to link
domestic law to universally accepted human rights principles is made necessary by the fact that throughout history, even civil servants and politicians in
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dictatorial governmental regimes have justified their impunity by claiming
that their behaviors actually adhered to the rule of law.”98 Consider what former U.S. President Richard Nixon said during an interview with Sir David
Frost in 1977. He declared as follows: “Well, when the president does it, that
means it is not illegal.”99
Scholars also argue that “if a legal system fails to meet the standards of the
formal version of the rule of law, it fails to meet the standards of the substantive version also.”100 It is important to note, however, that even if the national
laws of a country dutifully “incorporate provisions that address human rights
issues and hence, make national laws reflect universally accepted human
rights principles, there is no guarantee that such rights would be protected,
especially if those who serve in government (civil servants and politicians) do
not respect and obey the law.”101 In fact, if the country does not have a governing process that adequately constrains or guards the government, civil servants and political elites are likely to act with impunity even if the constitution
incorporates provisions of international human rights instruments.102 This implicates Professor Best’s argument that fundamental rights are not secured by
parchment barriers alone but by “a competent and balanced governing process.”103
The United Nations has also provided a definition for the rule of law:
[A] principle of governance in which all persons, institutions
and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It
requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the
law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.104
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Professor John Mitchell Finnis, an international expert on jurisprudence
and legal philosophy, has argued that the rule of law is “[t]he name commonly
given to the state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape.”105
He argues further:
A legal system exemplifies the Rule of Law to the extent . . .
that (i) its rules are prospective, not retroactive, and (ii) are not
in any other way impossible to comply with; that (iii) its rules
are promulgated, (iv) clear, and (v) coherent one with another;
that (vi) its rules are sufficiently stable to allow people to be
guided by their knowledge of the content of the rules; that (vii)
the making of decrees and orders applicable to relatively limited situations is guided by rules that are promulgated, clear,
stable, and relatively general; and that (viii) those people who
have authority to make, administer, and apply the rules in an
official capacity (a) are accountable for their compliance with
rules applicable to their performance and (b) do actually administer the law consistently and in accordance with its
tenor.106
The English-born American political activist and 18th century revolutionary, Thomas Paine, argued during the revolution that gave birth to the American Republic that “in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and
there ought to be no other.”107 In 1690, John Locke, the English philosopher
and physician who is considered the father of Liberalism, argued:
Where-ever law ends, tyranny begins, if the law be transgressed to another’s harm; and whosoever in authority exceeds
the power given him by the law, and makes use of the force he
has under his command, to compass that upon the subject
which the law allows not, ceases in that to be a magistrate, and,
acting without authority may be opposed, as any other man,
who by force invades the right of another.108
The Founders of the American Republic adopted Locke’s idea of the right
of the people to remove public officials who abuse the power granted to them
by the law and extended it to include “revolution,” which they defined as the
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“right of the people to dissolve the government and replace it with an entirely
new one.”109
Although many countries in Africa now boast of governing processes with
separation of powers, with checks and balances, the rule of law remains elusive and is threatened on a daily basis by various actions undertaken by both
state and non-state actors. Among these activities are violent and destructive
mobilization by subcultures that consider themselves marginalized by government policies; impunity by state custodians (i.e., civil servants and political
elites); and the activities of extremist groups, such as Boko Haram in West
Africa110 and Al Shabaab in East Africa.111 Before we examine threats to the
rule of law in Africa, it is necessary that we briefly elaborate the rule of law’s
most important and universally accepted elements.
B. The Elements of the Rule of Law
In order to fully examine the major threats to the rule of law in the African
countries, it is important to take a closer look at the elements of the rule of
law. A very important aspect of the rule of law is that “the government must
obey the law in its actions.”112 This view of the rule of law is shared by former
U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice, Anthony M. Kennedy, who stated that
“[t]he Law rests upon known, general principles applicable on equal terms to
all persons. It follows that the Law is superior to, and thus binds, the government and all of its officials.”113 Thus, the law must be supreme and the supremacy of law is, for the purposes of this article, the first element of the rule
of law.
As argued by the American Bar Association (A.B.A.), “[i]t is very difficult
for a nation to maintain the rule of law if its citizens do not [accept and] respect
the law.”114 The A.B.A. then makes this very revealing statement: “Assume
that people in your community decided that they didn’t want to be bothered
by traffic laws and began to ignore stop signs and traffic signals. The ability
109
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of police officers to enforce the laws would be overwhelmed and the streets
of your community would quickly become a chaotic and dangerous place.”115
But, why do people voluntarily obey the law? The A.B.A. argues that “[t]he
rule of law functions because most of us agree that it is important to observe
the law, even if a police officer is not present to enforce it.”116
If the majority of citizens in a country refuse to voluntarily accept and obey
the law, it would likely be very difficult for government agencies, such as the
police, whose job it is to enforce the laws and maintain order, to perform their
jobs. In fact, in such countries, maintaining law and order “would be extremely costly and the government would likely be forced to devote a significant portion of national income to compliance activities, a process that can
reduce expenditures on important sectors of the economy such as health care
and human capital development.”117 The second element of the rule of law is
that the majority of citizens in a country must voluntarily accept, respect, and
obey the law.118
In its many decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has contributed significantly to the development of the rule-of-law jurisprudence. For example, in
U.S. v. United Mine Workers,119 Justice Frankfurter concurred in the Court’s
judgment, writing:
In our country law is not a body of technicalities in the keeping
of specialists or in the service of any special interest. There can
be no free society without law administered through an independent judiciary. If one man can be allowed to determine for
himself what is law, every man can. That means first chaos,
then tyranny.120
Many of the definitions of the rule of law found in the legal literature share
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers that
“[t]here can be no free society without law administered through an independent judiciary.”121 As argued by Professor Chemerinsky, an expert on constitutions and constitutionalism, “[a]n independent judiciary is essential to the rule
of law.”122 The United Nations also acknowledged the importance of an independent judiciary to the rule of law when it stated that “the rule of law is a
principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public
115
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or private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated.”123 The third
element of the rule of law, then, is judicial independence.
In any country, the law cannot function effectively unless citizens “are
aware of, understand, and appreciate the law.”124 For countries in Africa,
“[r]obust and broad-based educational programs, including especially those
targeting heretofore marginalized and deprived groups,125 can help citizens,
not only understand the laws, but also appreciate them and the role that they
play in their daily lives.”126
It is important, however, to understand that these educational programs
must only supplement but not replace the full and effective participation of
each country’s relevant stakeholders in the constitution- and law-making processes.127 This includes: (1) developing and adopting the constitutional principles that would undergird, inform, and constrain the designers of the constitution; (2) selecting individuals to serve on the Constituent Assembly (that is,
the group that is empowered to draft the constitution); (3) providing necessary
input to the Constituent Assembly; (4) participating in the ratification of the
constitution; and (5) taking an active role in law-making in the post-constitutional period.128 The entire constitution-making process, as well as the enactment of laws in the post-constitutional period, must be open, transparent and
participatory.129 Finally, “[t]he application of laws must be predictable and
uniform and must not be capricious or arbitrary.”130 Hence, the fourth and fifth
elements of the rule of law are openness and transparency, and predictability
of the law respectively.
Many legal scholars have argued that the rule of law developed “around
the belief that a primary purpose of the rule of law is the protection of certain
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UNITED NATIONS, supra note 104 (emphasis added).
Mbaku, supra note 60, at 990.
125
These groups include “women, young people, rural inhabitants, the urban poor, and
religious and ethnic minorities.” Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5, at 192
n. 648.
126
Id.
127
Id. (noting that the educational programs “must be considered as supplementing but
not replacing the participation of citizens in constitutional design and the enactment of
post-constitutional laws”).
128
See MBAKU, supra note 61, at 81 (noting that the constitution-making process must
begin with the development and adoption of “the constitutional principles on which the
constitution would be based and which would guide the Constituent Assembly” and that
free and fair elections should be used to select members to the constitution-writing or Constituent Assembly).
129
Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5, at 192–93 (noting that the constitution-making process, as well as the enactment of laws in the post-constitutional period,
“must be open, transparent and participatory”).
130
Id. at 193.
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basic rights.”131 Many of the people who fought against colonialism and in
favor of independence in the African colonies “believed that independence
would provide them with the opportunity to rid themselves of the dysfunctional European institutions and replace them with institutional arrangements
designed exclusively by Africans and which would be undergirded by the rule
of law.”132 The hope of those Africans who participated in the decolonization
project was that the departure of the Europeans would allow them to dismantle
colonial institutions and develop and adopt governing processes capable of
adequately constraining the state, minimizing impunity, and guaranteeing the
recognition and protection of human rights.133 Hence, the sixth element of the
rule of law is the recognition and protection of human rights.
III. THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGITIMACY OF AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS
The rule of law is the cornerstone of any legitimate democratic State. In
general, the rule of law requires that the state “subject the citizenry” and itself
“to publicly promulgated laws.”134 In addition, “the state’s legislative function
[must] be separate from the adjudicative function” and “no one within the
polity [must] be above the law.”135 Adherence or fidelity to the rule of law is
one of the “three essential characteristics of modern constitutionalism.”136 The
others are protection of human rights and the guarding or constraining of the
exercise of government power.137
The rule of law is so important to constitutional democracy that, without
it, it would be impossible to have constitutional government. One cannot consider a contemporary African state as legitimate, particularly from the point
of view of the majority of its citizens, if it is lacking any or all of the three
characteristics of the modern constitutional State. In today’s African countries, the absence or lack of these three elements or characteristics has not only
greatly diminished prospects for the practice of constitutionalism but has also
delegitimized the State—at least, in the eyes of some of the country’s subcultures—and has significantly increased the distrust that many subcultures have
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What is the Rule of Law, supra note 114.
Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5, at 192.
133
See John Mukum Mbaku & Julius O. Ihonvbere, Introduction: Issues in Africa’s Political Adjustment in the ‘New’ Global Era, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 1, 2 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius
O. Ihonvbere eds., 2003) (noting that Africans expected that independence would grant
them the opportunity to create their own constitutions and institutions).
134
See Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2001).
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for their governments.138 This is particularly true among groups that have historically been exploited and “marginalized and pushed to the economic and
political periphery.”139
But, why should Africans bother themselves about constitutionalism and
how the latter is related to the rule of law? First, the practice of constitutionalism will ensure that, in each country, the constitution will not eventually
become just “another instrument of rule” that is likely to be “discarded altogether.”140 Second, constitutional government can and “must provide a solid
basis for the respect of the rule of law, democracy, and good governance.”141
Nevertheless, constitutionalism has been distinguished from democracy and
the rule of law.142 As argued by constitutional scholar, Professor Charles
Manga Fombad, while “many of the core elements of constitutionalism . . .
are also necessary for the rule of law to exist, . . . the latter concept [i.e., the
rule of law] is slightly narrower in scope.”143 Although “[r]espect for the rule
of law on its own may not necessarily lead to the existence of constitutionalism,” however, “constitutionalism is safeguarded by the rule of law and without the rule of law there can be no constitutionalism.”144
It has been argued that “constitutional democracy under the rule of law”
may not always be desirable or “the best alternative”145 and that, in some situations, it might be “superfluous and undesirable.”146 Rosenfeld argues, for
example, that “in a close knit homogeneous society that is deeply religious
and ruled by revered leaders who are widely believed to have direct access to
divine commands, a theocracy would plainly seem more appropriate than a
constitutional democracy”147 and that “instructions and directions imparted by
the religious leaders would be paramount, leaving little, if any, room for the
rule of law.”148
Nevertheless, in divided or heterogeneous societies, which are likely to
face “various competing conceptions of the good, constitutional democracy
138
See Mbaku, supra note 60, at 1013 (noting that “making certain that public decisions
are made through transparent processes can significantly minimize the distrust that many
ethnic and religious groups have for their governments”).
139
Id.
140
Le Vine, supra note 25.
141
See Charles Manga Fombad, Constitutional Reforms and Constitutionalism in Africa:
Reflections on Some Current Challenges and Future Prospects, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1007,
1015 (2011).
142
See Charles M. Fombad, Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights
in Africa and the Enabling Role of Political Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern Africa, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 8–10 (2007).
143
Id. at 8.
144
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Rosenfeld, supra note 134, at 1310.
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and adherence to the rule of law may well be indispensable to achieving political cohesion with minimum oppression.”149 African countries are divided
societies—they comprise of different subcultures or ethnocultural groups that
usually do not share the same culture, customs, traditions, and values. It is
possible that these different groups do not share the “same conceptions of the
good.”150 It is also argued that even if a society is homogenous, it can still be
“pluralistic-in-fact” if “every person is viewed as entitled to pursue his or her
own individual good.”151
Where society is “pluralistic-in-fact,” that is, groups or individuals within
the society do not have or share the same values, the question of the legitimacy
of the state and its “fundamental political institutions” will “ultimately depend[] on some kind of consent among all those who are subjected to such
institutions.”152 This tradition ties the legitimacy of the state and governing
institutions to the consent of the governed (i.e., the sovereign) and can be
traced to the ideas of the Founders of the American Republic, such as James
Madison, as well as those of Thomas Hobbes153 and John Locke.154
When designing of the U.S. Constitution, the drafters argued that a government had to “stand on the original and ongoing consent of the governed.”155 The founders of the American Republic adopted John Locke’s idea
of “ongoing consent” and greatly extended it to include “the right of the people to dissolve the government and replace it with an entirely new one,”156
even if that had to be undertaken or achieved through revolution. James Madison, considered the Father of the American Constitution, defined the “republican” form of government in Federalist No. 39 as:

149

Id.
Id. at 1311. It is clear that those white South Africans who subscribed to and supported
the apartheid system in South Africa did not share the same conceptions of the good with
the African groups that were being oppressed and exploited. Apartheid’s supporters
preached a gospel of white supremacy and permanent African inferiority. Hence, the country’s two main groups—peoples of African origin and those of European ancestry—did not
share the same view or conceptions of the good. See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON,
WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMERICAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY
(1981) (examining U.S. and South African experiences with white supremacy).
151
Rosenfeld, supra note 134, at 1311.
152
Id.
153
Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher who is considered one of the founders of
modern political philosophy. Hobbes is best known for the book Leviathan, which he wrote
and published in 1651. In this book, Hobbes expounded his theory of the social contract.
See THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (1651).
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John Locke was an English philosopher and physician who is widely regarded as the
father of Liberalism. His ideas about government influenced many of the Founders of the
American Republic, including James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. See LOCKE, supra
note 108.
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Best, supra note 103, at 39 (emphasis in original).
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[A] government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered
by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited
period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government, that it be derived from the great body of the society,
not from an inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of
it.157
There are a lot of reasons why some groups within African countries consider their governments illegitimate. These include, but are not limited to, the
fact that many incumbent governments (1) did not come into being with the
consent of these groups; (2) do not seek these groups’ ongoing consent to
govern; (3) do not protect the rights of all groups; (4) promote values that are
totally different from, and in many cases antithetical, to those that many
groups hold dear; and (5) engage in behaviors (e.g., corruption) that marginalize some subcultures and force them to live perpetually in extreme poverty
on the economic margins. Among African governments that are seen as illegitimate by some subcultures within their individual countries, the Republic
of Cameroon is a very good example. In today’s Republic of Cameroon, many
Anglophones do not see the Francophone-dominated central government as
legitimate. This is due primarily to (1) the atrocities committed against the
Anglophones by the central government; (2) the failure of the central government to include Anglophones in the design and implementation of public policy; (3) concerted efforts by the central government to destroy Anglophone
institutions (e.g., the replacement of the Common Law by French Civil law in
Anglophone courts); and (4) the failure of the central government to promote
economic growth and development in the Anglophone Regions.158

157

James Madison, Federalist. No. XXXIX (For the Independent Journal), in THE
FEDERALIST: A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, BEING A
COLLECTION OF ESSAYS WRITTEN IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION AGREED UPON
SEPTEMBER 17, 1787, 232, 233 (James Madison & John Jay eds., G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
1888) (emphasis in original). Some scholars argue that Locke’s consent is “actual consent
of the governed,” while that professed by the likes of John Rawls is “hypothetical consent”
based “on the basic institutions of society.” See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–13
(1971).
158
See Walters Samah, Anglophone Minority and the State in Cameroon: Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, in MINORITIES AND THE STATE IN AFRICA 243, 253 (Michael
U. Mbanaso & Chima J. Korieh eds., 2010) (noting that the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon are “relatively largely underdeveloped” and that “there is a feeling of frustration
among Anglophones regarding their second-class status”). The Republic of Cameroon is
divided into ten sub-national units called Regions. Of these, two of them are located in the
former UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British administration, which is
generally referred to as the Anglophone part of the country. The two Anglophone Regions
are Northwest Region and Southwest Region. See BOBBO NFOR TANSI, AN ASSESSMENT OF
CAMEROON’S WIND AND SOLAR ENERGY POTENTIAL: A GUIDE FOR A SUSTAINABLE
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What is now the Republic of Cameroon came into being in 1961 through
a merger of the UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British administration with the République du Cameroun.159 While Cameroon “is made
up of over 250 ethnic groups, which form five major regional-cultural groupings,” the most politically divisive and challenging division of the population
is that which is based on colonial heritage.160 When unification took place in
1961 between the U.N. Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons under British
administration and the République du Cameroun, the new country that was
created brought together what came to be known as the Anglo-Saxon161 and
Gaullist162 traditions. In the new union, Southern Cameroonians came to be
known as “Anglophones” and citizens of the République du Cameroun were
called “Francophones.”163
Since 1961, Anglophones have complained that they have been systematically marginalized, both politically and economically, by the FrancophoneECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 20 (2011) (providing a list of Cameroon’s ten Regions and their
capital cities).
159
After World War I, the German colony of Kamerun became League of Nations Mandates to be administered by Great Britain and France. Britain received one-fifth of the territory and divided it into Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons. When the UN
was founded in 1945, the Mandates were converted into UN Trust Territories. On January
1, 1960, the UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration gained independence and took the name République du Cameroun. In 1961, the UN held plebiscites
in the UN Trust Territory of Southern Cameroons and the UN Trust Territory of Northern
Cameroons under British administration to determine modalities for independence. Northern Cameroons opted to join the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which had gained independence from Britain in 1960, and the Southern Cameroons voted to join the now independent
République du Cameroun to form a federation called the Federal Republic of Cameroon.
That federation was unilaterally abolished in 1972 and since then, the country has functioned as a unitary republic. See, e.g., VICTOR T. LE VINE, THE CAMEROONS: FROM
MANDATE TO INDEPENDENCE (1964) (examining the struggle of French Cameroons for independence); see also WILLARD R. JOHNSON, THE CAMEROON FEDERATION: POLITICAL
INTEGRATION IN A FRAGMENTARY SOCIETY (1970) (examining the challenges of federation
in Cameroon).
160
See JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF CAMEROON 1 (2005).
161
In Cameroon, the Anglo-Saxon tradition includes the English language and the common law of England and Wales. The common law is a legal system in which judicial precedent is considered an important source for future decision making, and a highly decentralized form of government and political decision making. See, e.g., H. N. A. ENONCHONG,
CAMEROON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FEDERALISM IN A MIXED COMMON-LAW AND CIVILLAW SYSTEM (1967) (examining Cameroon’s mixed common law and civil law system).
162
The Gaullist tradition includes the French language, French Civil law, and a highly
decentralized form of government and political decision making with an imperial or reinforced presidency. See, e.g., RICHARD A. JOSEPH, GAULLIST AFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER
AHMADU AHIDJO (1978) (examining the Gaullist system in Cameroon).
163
See FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS & CIVIL
LIBERTIES 2000–2001, 123 (Adrian Karatnycky & Freedom House Survey Team eds.,
2001) (arguing that in Cameroon, “[t]he linguistic distinction constitutes the country’s most
potent political division”).
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dominated central government. In addition to the fact that virtually all of the
top-level civil servants and political elites that have governed Cameroon have
been Francophones, no Anglophone has ever served as President of the Republic of Cameroon. All Anglophones who have served in the president’s cabinet have usually been given positions with no real decision-making authority.
In fact, in 2017, fifty-six years after unification, “there was only one Anglophone among 36 ministers with portfolio.”164
It is estimated that about seventy percent of the natural resources that are
exported from Cameroon are extracted out of the Anglophone Regions of the
country.165 Yet, the two Anglophone Regions receive less than ten percent of
the revenues accruing to the government from such exploitation. In addition,
infrastructure in the Anglophone Regions, including especially the road system, remains essentially either underdeveloped or nonexistent.166
Many Anglophones have complained that their political and economic
marginalization is due to the fact that since unification in 1961, the central
government has governed the country without their consent.167 That failure to
consult, the Anglophones argue, has resulted in the design and implementation of public policies that have underdeveloped the Anglophone Regions of
the country and forced the people to live in abject poverty while the Francophone Regions continue to enjoy relatively robust rates of development.168
In late-2016, Anglophone lawyers and teachers organized and carried out
a peaceful protest against efforts by the Francophone-dominated central government to impose French institutions on the Anglophone Regions.169 Specifically, Anglophone lawyers were complaining about the central government’s
decision to impose French civil law on courts in the Anglophone Regions and
to require that the adjudication of court cases should be undertaken only in
French.170 Anglophone teachers joined the strike and demonstrations in response to the central government’s decision to impose the French language on
164

CAMEROON’S ANGLOPHONE CRISIS AT THE CROSSROADS, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
GROUP 8 (2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-cameroo
ns-anglophone-crisis-crossroads.
165
Samah, supra note 158, at 253–54 (stating that “Anglophone Cameroon produces 70
percent of the country’s natural resources”).
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See generally CAMEROON’S ANGLOPHONE CRISIS AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 164.
168
See, e.g., MUFOR ATANGA, THE ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON PREDICAMENT (2011) (examining the marginalization of Anglophones in Cameroon); see also PIET KONINGS &
FRANCIS B. NYAMNJOH, NEGOTIATING AN ANGLOPHONE IDENTITY: A STUDY OF THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND REPRESENTATION IN CAMEROON (2003) (examining issues
of Anglophone marginalization in Cameroon and making suggestions on how to resolve
the issues).
169
Moki Edwin Kindzeka, Lawyers, Teachers in Cameroon Strike for More English in
Anglophone Regions, VOA NEWS (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.voanews.com/a/lawyers-t
eachers-strike-cameroon-more-english-anglophone-regions/3616197.html.
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schools in the Anglophone Regions, as well as send French-speaking teachers
to teach subjects other than French language and literature in Anglophone
schools.171 In addition to requesting that both the French Civil law system and
the French language not be imposed on Anglophone courts, the striking lawyers also wanted the central government to remove all French-speaking
judges, specifically those who cannot communicate and write well in English,
from Anglophone courts, as well as make certain that all national laws, including treaties and international conventions to which Cameroon is a State
Party, are also provided in English.172
Although the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon guarantees the
equality of English and French, the latter dominates in political discourse, including especially the communications of the central government, and that
includes not just decrees issued by the President of the Republic, but also legislative enactments, treaties, and conventions signed or entered into by the
country.173 This situation is especially troublesome for many Anglophone
lawyers who must secure, at their own expense, translations of treaties signed
and ratified by the country, since the documents are all in French. These unofficial translations, of course, are not accepted as legal documents before the
country’s courts and tribunals.174
The demonstrations against actual and perceived marginalization of the
Anglophones by the Francophone-dominated central government started in
late-2016.175 Rather than engage in dialogue with the protesters, the central
government responded with brute force and extreme violence.176 In fact, security forces sent to the Anglophone Regions by the central government used
“live bullets and tear gas to disperse” the protesting Anglophones and in the
process, several people were killed.177 In view of the government’s violent
response to the peaceful protests, as well as President Paul Biya’s unwillingness to engage in dialogue with the aggrieved Anglophones, more radical
groups within the Anglophone Regions declared their intention to secede and
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Id.; see also Teachers in English-Speaking Areas of Cameroon Remain on Strike,
VOA (Oct. 7, 2017), https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/4059569.html (noting that the
Cameroon Anglophone Teacher’s Union, which joined striking lawyers, was concerned
about the government’s practice of sending French-speaking teachers to the Anglophone
Regions to teach “in areas outside of their training”).
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John Russell, Lawyers in Cameroon Are Fighting the Justice System, VOA NEWS
(Nov. 17, 2016), https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/lawyers-in-cameroon-are-fighting
-the-justice-system/3600857.html.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, Jan. 18, 1996, arts. 1–3.
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Id. (stating that most official documents are written only in French).
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Conor Gaffey, Understanding Cameroon’s Anglophone Protests, NEWSWEEK (Feb.
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form the independent Republic of Ambazonia.178 That decision significantly
escalated what had already deteriorated into a bloody and extremely violent
conflict—in fact, by the spring of 2018, the international press was reporting
that more than 2,000 people had been killed in the Anglophone Regions and
as many as 170 villages burned.179 Some members of the international community were calling the activities of the central government in the Anglophone Regions a genocide against the Anglophone peoples.180
Cameroon, of course, is not the only country in which the failure of the
government to adhere to the rule of law or practice constitutionalism has
forced some population groups within the country to consider the government
illegitimate. Other examples include Mali,181 South Sudan,182 and the Central
African Republic.183
178

The declaration creating a new country called the Republic of Ambazonia was made
on October 1, 2017. See, e.g., Abu-Bakarr Jalloh, Cameroon in Angst Over ‘Ambazonia
Independence Anniversary’, DW (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-in-ang
st-over-ambazonia-independence-anniversary/a-45712977.
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Samuel Smith, Cameroon: Over 2,000 Killed, 170 Villages Burned as Military Takes
Control of Churches, CHRISTIAN EXAMINER (Aug. 11, 2018), https://www.christianexamin
er.com/article/cameroon-over-2000-killed-170-villages-burned-as-military-takes-controlof-churches/51812.htm.
180
See Peter Zongo, ‘This Is a Genocide’: Villages Burn as War Rages in Blood-Soaked
Cameroon, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-develop
ment/2018/may/30/cameroon-killings-escalate-anglophone-crisis (noting, inter alia, that
the international community is now referring to the Anglophone crisis as a genocide committed by the central government on Anglophone citizens).
181
In Mali, the Tuareg, who have fought the central government since 1963, have remained unwilling to recognize the legitimacy of any of the regimes that have ruled the
country from Bamako, the capital city. See, e.g., Ra’pheal Davis, Addressing Conflict in
Mali: Political, Humanitarian, and Security Problems, SIGMA IOTA RHO J. OF INT’L REL.
(Oct. 1, 2018), http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2018/10/1/addressing-conflict-in-malipolitical-humanitarian-and-security-problems; see also YUSUF IBRAHIM GAMAWA, THE
TUAREGS AND THE 2012 REBELLION IN MALI 35–37 (2017) (examining the continuing struggle between the central government and various militias for control of the northern parts of
Mali).
182
Since December 2013, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition
(SPLM-IO), led by former Vice President, Riek Machar and populated mainly by members
of the Nuer subculture, have fought the government of President Salva Kiir and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The SPLM is led by Kiir and is dominated by
Kirr’s Dinka subculture. The SPLM-IO does not see the SPLM and Kiir as the country’s
legitimate governors. The civil war has killed more than 400,000 people and displaced
more than four million others. See Winsor, supra note 16.
183
The Central African Republic’s present civil war started after Séléka rejected the legitimacy of President François Bozize and overthrew him in early 2013. Bozize’s support
came primarily from the Christian anti-Balaka militias. The war has involved primarily
struggles between rebels from the Séléka coalition and anti-Balaka militias. The Séléka are
made up primarily of Muslim groups while the anti-Balaka consists primarily of Christian
militias. Although the various armed groups reached a peace deal early in 2019, the violence has not fully abated. See Central African Republic Armed Groups Reach Peace Deal,
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In pluralistic societies, consent is not only important and critical to the legitimacy of the government, but it also provides a foundation for constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It is important to note, however, that
constitutional democracies usually implement “the will of political majorities” and as a consequence, can force “political minorities to contribute to the
realization of majority objectives with which minorities may strongly disagree.”184 The Founders of the American Republic faced this problem and
sought ways to place significant checks or constraints on the power of the
majority in order to minimize what they referred to as majority (majoritarian)
tyranny or tyranny of majority faction.185 In doing so, Madison and his contemporaries argued that minimizing tyranny by majority faction required
much more than using the constitution to place constraints on the government
or guard the latter. These constitutional constraints, which Madison referred
to as “parchment barriers,” were a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
the effective and full protection of fundamental rights and the minimization
of majority tyranny. A constitution, it is argued, is just “a piece of paper, and
‘parchment barriers’ are never much use against lead and steel and chains and
guns.”186 Madison argued, in correspondence with Thomas Jefferson, that
“experience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when
its control is most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment barriers
have been committed by overbearing majorities in every State.”187 In Federalist No. 51, Madison argued that given the fact that an oppressive majority
“cannot be restrained,” it is necessary, then, to make certain that an oppressive
majority does not form.188 He then proceeded to present arguments for “extent
of territory” and “multiplicity of interests, which he argued were the “cure”
for this major threat to “majority-rule regimes.”189 He then stated that:
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/world/africa/central-african-republic-peace-deal.html. In 2015, Noureddine Adam, head of one of the factions of
Séléka, proclaimed an autonomous state in the northeastern part of the country. See Crispin
Dembassa-Kette, Rebel Declares Autonomous State in Central African Republic, REUTERS
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-centralafrica-politics/rebel-declares-autonomous-state-in-central-african-republic-idUKKBN0TY1FO20151215.
184
Rosenfeld, supra note 134, at 1312.
185
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, 276–77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
186
See Benjamin R. Barber, Constitutional Rights—Democratic Instrument or Democratic Obstacle?, in THE FRAMERS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 23, 30 (Robert A. Licht ed.,
1991).
187
ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM PARCHMENT TO POWER: HOW JAMES MADISON USED THE
BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE THE CONSTITUTION 97 (1997) (quoting Madison to Jefferson (Oct.
17, 1788)).
188
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)).
189
Id.
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part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens.
If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure.190
The Constitution, Madison argued, was crafted to minimize or prevent the
formation of oppressive majorities “by comprehending in the society so many
separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.”191 Madison went
on to argue that:
There are but two methods of providing against this evil:192 the
one by creating a will in the community independent of the
majority—that is, of society itself; . . . . [This] method prevails
in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed
authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a
power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major as the rightful interests of the minor
party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.193
Madison’s argument was that without effective and robust supporting political institutions, the rights contained in the Constitution (e.g., a Bill of
Rights) would be nothing but parchment barriers to majoritarian tyranny.194
Hence, rights are secured, not just by parchment barriers alone, but also by
the existence of what Best refers to as “a competent and balanced governing
process.”195
But, is there a relationship between constitutional democracy, the rule of
law, and the legitimacy of government? First, if a constitutional democracy is
used only to implement the will of the majority or push through policies that
benefit exclusively or even primarily the majority and marginalize the minority, it is likely the case that the minority will consider the government illegitimate. The minority, as has been illustrated by several situations in the African
countries,196 may opt for violent and destructive mobilization in an effort
190

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 188, at 291.
Id. at 292.
192
That is, majoritarian tyranny.
193
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 188, at 291–92.
194
Best, supra note 103. Such a governing process is undergirded by the separation of
powers with effective checks and balances—an independent judiciary; a bicameral legislature, with each chamber allowed to exercise an absolute veto over legislation passed by
the other; and an independent and competent executive.
195
Id.
196
This situation is aptly illustrated by the decision of a group of subcultures in Eastern
Nigeria, led by Col. Emeka Ojukwu, to secede and found their own state called the
191
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either to capture the government or secede and form their own State.197 In
other words, if, as feared by Madison and other Founders of the American
Republic, constitutional democracy becomes a tool used to inflict tyranny on
the minority by majority faction, regardless of how it is constituted,198 the
minority can resort to revolution, as happened in Nigeria (1967–1970) and is
currently taking place in Cameroon (2019).199
The founders of the American Republic recognized the problem of tyranny
by majority faction and borrowed Locke’s idea of the right of the governed
(i.e., the people) to remove from office officials—whether civil servants or
politicians—who had abused the power granted them by the people through
the constitution.200 They then extended Locke’s idea to include revolution,
which the founders of the American Republic defined as the “right of the people to dissolve the government and to replace it with an entirely new one.”201
Thus, to ensure the state does not lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the various
groups that exist within the country, it is necessary to guard against tyranny
by majority faction and make certain that the apparatus of government is not
used to suppress or exploit some groups within the country.
Republic of Biafra. For example, in a State of the Nation speech to the people of the secessionist Republic of Biafra, its leader, Col. Ojukwu, justified the decision to secede from
the Federal Republic of Nigeria by stating that “Nigeria persecuted and slaughtered her
minorities; Nigerian justice was a farce; her elections, her census, her politics—her everything—was corrupt.” Emeka Ojukwu, The Ahiara Declaration: The Principles of the Biafran Revolution, BIAFRA NATION http://www.biafraland.com/ahiara_declaration_1969.htm
l (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
197
See generally AL J. VENTER, BIAFRA’S WAR, 1967–1970: A TRIBAL CONFLICT IN
NIGERIA THAT LEFT A MILLION DEAD (2015) (summarizing the efforts of supporters of Biafra to destabilize Nigeria).
198
Most majority factions in the African countries are coalitions of subcultures. An example is the ruling coalition in Kenya, which is made up primarily of the Kikuyu and
Kalenjin subcultures. President Uhuru Kenyatta is a Kikuyu (Gikuyu) and his Deputy President, William Ruto, is a Kalenjin. See, e.g., Uhuru Kenyatta: Kenya’s ‘Digital President’,
BBC NEWS (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21544245 (noting
that Kenyatta receives most of his support primarily from the Kikuyu subculture and Ruto’s
from the Kalenjin subculture).
199
Between 1967 and 1970, several minority ethnic groups in Nigeria, reacting to what
they argued was oppression by the majority faction, opted to secede to form their own state.
Ojukwu, supra note 196. Although the effort, which resulted in a brutal civil war, was
unsuccessful, it nevertheless revealed several forms of dysfunction within the Nigerian political system. See, e.g., PETER BAXTER, BIAFRA: THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, 1967–1970
(2015) (examining the civil war that followed the decision by several minority ethnic
groups in the Eastern Region of Nigeria to secede and found the Republic of Biafra). In
October 2016, lawyers and teachers in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon engaged in
peaceful demonstrations against what they argued was their marginalization by the Francophone-dominated central government. The government responded with brute force, leading to what the international community has described as genocide against the Anglophones. See, e.g., Zongo, supra note 180.
200
See Best, supra note 103, at 39.
201
Id.
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Second, the rule of law only functions if (1) the law is supreme; (2) a majority of citizens voluntarily accept and respect the law; (3) the judiciary is
independent; (4) there is openness and transparency in government communication; (5) the law is predictable; and (6) there is a recognition and protection of human rights.202 Take the supremacy of law, for example. In a country
where there is fidelity to the rule of law, it is the case that “[t]he law is superior
to all members of society, including government officials vested with either
executive, legislative, or judicial power.”203 As argued by Dicey, fidelity to
the rule of law implies that:
[N]o man is above the law, but that every man, whatever his
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm,
and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals . . . .
With us, every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for
every act done without legal justification as any other citizen.204
Unfortunately, in many African countries, certain high-ranking civil servants and political elites consider themselves above the law and act with impunity. These high-ranking officials are called “untouchables” in many African
countries and are rarely, if ever, prosecuted for their crimes, which include
corrupt enrichment, as well as various atrocities committed against their fellow citizens.205 In fact, in 2008, the President of the Republic of Cameroon,
Paul Biya, had the constitution amended to place himself above the law.206
Specifically, the constitution was amended to grant Biya blanket immunity
from all crimes committed while in office.207 According to Article 53(3) of
the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, “[a]cts committed by the President of the Republic . . . shall be covered by immunity and he shall not be
accountable for them after the exercise of his functions.”208
If high-ranking officials, including especially the president, consider themselves above the law and act accordingly, marginalized and oppressed
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Stein, supra note 88, at 301–02.
Id. at 302.
204
JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 34 (1959).
205
See, e.g., JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, CORRUPTION IN AFRICA: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND CLEANUPS 96–97 (2010) (noting the failure or unwillingness of the government in
Cameroon to prosecute certain high-ranking civil servants and political elites who act
above the law).
206
Constitution Amended to Open Door for Biya’s Third Term, RADIO FR. INT’L (Nov. 4,
2008), http://www1.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/100/article_53.asp.
207
Id.
208
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON (1972) art. 53(3).
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individuals and groups are likely to lose their trust in the government. Some
groups may actually consider the government illegitimate and seek ways, including the use of violence, to either oust that government or secede and form
their own state.
Effectively resolving this political quagmire requires, at the minimum, that
the country put in place the following: (1) provide, through a democratic, bottom-up, people-driven, participatory and inclusive constitution-making process, a constitution that creates a governing process undergirded by separation
of powers, with checks and balances. Those checks and balances should include an independent judiciary; (2) a guarantee of freedom of the press—social scientists have determined that a country in which civil society possesses
“free speech, a free press, and freedom of opposition has a greater potential
for influencing the decisions of the elites than does a country where these liberties do not exist”;209 (3) a bicameral legislature, with each chamber allowed
to exercise an absolute veto over legislation passed by the other; and (4) an
independent and competent executive.
In countries where (i) civil servants and political elites consider themselves
above the law and act with impunity; (ii) there is a lack of openness and transparency in government communication, making it very difficult for the people
to have access to the information that they need to check on the government;
(iii) there is a lack of predictability in the law, making it extremely difficult
for citizens to understand what the law is; (iv) the judiciary is not independent
but is subservient to the executive and, in addition, is subject to political manipulation; (v) there is an imperial or reinforced presidency, with the president
engaging routinely in various forms of abuse of power; and (vi) there exists a
subservient and extremely weak legislature, and governance is unlikely to be
characterized by the practice of constitutional democracy and adherence to the
rule of law.
Public policy-making in these countries is likely to be dominated by the
ruling majority faction, with virtually no participation by minority groups. As
a consequence, the outcome of the policy-making process would usually be
policies that do not reflect the interests and values of the country’s various
minorities. Within such an institutional environment, there is likely to be a
rise in government impunity and a marked deterioration in the protection of
fundamental rights, including especially those of vulnerable groups, such as
women, infants and children, and ethnic and religious minorities. Tyranny by
majority faction will eventually become a pervasive part of public policy. The
resulting economic and political marginalization of these minority groups and
their subsequent relegation to the margins, can force some of them to resort to
violent mobilization, creating conditions that can deteriorate into prolonged
civil strife and perhaps, war. Hence, it is important that each country provide
209
See Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 370, 372 (1980).
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itself with institutional arrangements undergirded by the rule of law and the
practice of constitutional democracy. In the absence of such institutional arrangements, the government is unlikely to be considered legitimate, especially
by groups that have been driven to the political and economic margins by the
ruling majority faction.
IV. THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA
A. Introduction
Although African countries currently suffer from a plethora of economic,
political and social problems, the most important of them include how to (1)
effectively manage diversity and significantly enhance peaceful coexistence;
(2) create an institutional environment that encourages and enhances entrepreneurship and the creation of wealth that can be used to deal with extreme
poverty and provide for human development; (3) eradicate, or at the very least,
minimize corruption and other behaviors that stunt entrepreneurship and economic growth; (4) recognize and protect human rights, including especially
those of vulnerable groups, such as women, children, and religious and ethnic
minorities; (5) emphasize public policies that are pro-poor and enhance the
ability of people living in extreme poverty to develop the skills and competencies that they need to participate more productively and gainfully in economic growth; (6) prevent government impunity, particularly the abuse of
power by the president and other high-ranking officials and political elites;
and (7) minimize opportunities for the capture of the state by private business
interests.210 These issues are directly linked to the failure of African countries
to have effective and fully-functioning constitutional governance and rule-oflaw regimes. In the sections that follow, this article examines the most important threats to the rule of law in the African countries.
B. Government Impunity as a Major Threat to the Rule of Law in Africa
One of the most important threats to the rule of law in the African countries
is government impunity, particularly the abuse of power by the president and
other high-ranking public servants and politicians. In each African country,
“[i]mpunity usually arises from the failure by relevant public authorities, either through lack of capacity or political will, to bring perpetrators of crimes

210
See generally MBAKU, supra note 61, at 41–45, 91–112 (examining the pervasiveness
of certain political and economic problems in the African countries); see also John Mukum
Mbaku, Rule of Law, State Capture, and Human Development in Africa, 33 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 771 (2018) (examining state capture in Africa and its impact on human development, with emphasis on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of South
Africa).
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to account for those crimes.”211 Specifically, impunity can occur in a country
when the government deliberately or through neglect, exempts “from prosecution and punishment,” individuals, whether state- or non-state actors, who
engage in criminal activities or behaviors.212 Impunity can also arise from the
case where an individual who is convicted and fined by a recognized tribunal
is allowed by the government to escape the payment of the fines.213
In international law, impunity often involves the failure of governments to
bring to justice individuals who violate human rights or commit atrocities that
threaten international peace and security, and the failure of governments to
redress the wrongs done to victims. In countries, such as Somalia, Democratic
Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Republic of Sudan,214 where the
perpetrators of human rights violations are likely to be members of the incumbent government or their agents, it is often the case that those who commit the
various atrocities are not likely to be brought to justice.215 In these countries,
the government either no longer has control over most of the national territory
or, for a variety of reasons, is not willing or able to bring those who have
committed international crimes to justice.216
In Africa, impunity is endemic in countries, which have weak217 or dysfunctional218 governing processes. In these countries, civil servants and
211

Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5, at 94.
Id.
213
Id.
214
For example, consider the Interahamwe in Rwanda and the Janjaweed in the Republic
of Sudan. In Rwanda, the Interahamwe was an extremist government-backed militia that
was responsible for most of the killings that took place during the Rwanda Genocide in the
Spring of 1994. See, e.g., DENISE BENTROVATO, NARRATING AND TEACHING THE NATION:
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN PRE- AND POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA (2015) (examining the
role played by the Interahamwe in the Rwanda Genocide). The Janjaweed are a militia
group in western Sudan that has actively participated, along with the government in Khartoum, in the genocide in Darfur. Founded in 1987, its membership consists primarily of
Sudanese Arab tribes. See generally MODERN GENOCIDE: THE DEFINITIVE RESOURCE AND
DOCUMENT COLLECTION 641 (Paul R. Bartrop & Steven Leonard Jacobs eds., 2014) (examining the participation of the Janjaweed in the atrocities committed by the government
of Sudan in the Darfur Region of the country). Many scholars of genocide studies have
recognized the Janjaweed as “the principal agent of mass murder, rape, and property destruction in the Darfur region of Sudan.” Id. at 693.
215
Mbaku, Rule of Law, State Capture, and Human Development in Africa, supra note
210, at 94.
216
Id.
217
In a country, such as South Sudan, the government has been severely weakened by
fighting between subcultures—mainly the ruling Dinka and the opposition Nuer—for control of the apparatus of government. In fact, in 2013, the fighting deteriorated into a civil
war that continues to this day. See, e.g., JOHN YOUNG, SOUTH SUDAN’S CIVIL WAR:
VIOLENCE, INSURGENCY AND FAILED PEACEMAKING (2019) (examining South Sudan’s descent into violent and destructive civil war in December 2013).
218
In some countries, such as Cameroon, the main issue is not the lack of capacity by the
government. Instead, it is the fact that state capacity is being used by the president and
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political elites are not well-constrained or guarded by the law, and, as a consequence, these individuals are able to act with impunity. For example, in
Cameroon, government security forces, which have committed and continue
to commit atrocities in the Anglophone Regions of the country, have been
protected by the government. None of them has ever been brought to justice
for the massacre of Anglophones and the burning of their villages. In fact,
some international observers now refer to the atrocities committed against Anglophones by Cameroon’s central government as “genocide.”219 In addition,
the police “routinely arrest and torture individuals suspected of being homosexuals or engaging in same-sex intimacy but are not prosecuted for such human rights abuses.”220 In recent years, government security forces have been
using laws against terrorism to arrest, torture, and violate the rights of journalists and other members of civil society who are working to check the exercise of government power.221 Yet, none of these security officials, who “arrest
and detain journalists without probable cause” have ever been brought to justice.222
The culture of impunity that pervades the government of the Republic of
Cameroon starts from the top—the country’s president, Paul Biya, can be considered the leader and chief culprit in “this insidious culture of impunity.”223
In 2008, Biya had the constitution amended to grant him immunity from
crimes committed while in office. As made possible by Article 53(3) of the
amended constitution,224 after he leaves office, Biya cannot be prosecuted for
members of his government to oppress several sectors of the population, primarily the Anglophones. See, e.g., Denis Foretia, Cameroon Continues Its Oppression of English Speakers, WASH. POST (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions
/wp/2017/03/21/cameroon-continues-its-oppression-of-english-speakers (examining the
continued oppression of the Anglophones by the Francophone-dominated central government in Cameroon); see also Hollie McKay, War of Words: Oppressed English Speakers
Targeted in Escalating Cameroonian Conflict, FOX NEWS (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.fo
xnews.com/world/oppressed-english-speakers-in-cameroon-targeted-in-escalating-conflic
t (noting that since the conflict started, “more than 400 [people] have been killed . . . , and
a further 437,000 people have been displaced, the vast majority being women and children”).
219
Zongo, supra note 180.
220
Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5, at 95; see also Guilty by Association:
Human Rights Violations in the Enforcement of Cameroon’s Anti-Homosexuality Law,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 21, 2013), https://www. hrw.org/report/2013/03/21/guilty-a
ssociation/human-rights-violations-enforcement-cameroons-anti.
221
Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity supra note 5, at 95 (noting that “Cameroon’s security forces have been using laws against terrorism to torture and violate the human rights
of journalists and other citizens”).
222
Id.
223
Id. at 96.
224
The official name of the amended constitution is “Loi no 2008–1 du 14 avril 2008
modifiant et complétant certaines dispositions de la loi no 96 –6 du 18 janvier 1996 portant
révision de la Constitution du 2 juin 1972.” Law No. 2008–1 of 14 April 2008 to Amend
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any crimes that he committed while he was in office. The amended constitution effectively puts him above the law.225
The constitutional amendment of 2008 granted the President of the Republic of Cameroon a blanket exemption. It “does not make an exemption in the
case of serious offenses, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic
cleansing, and genocide.”226 As a consequence, the country’s legal system will
not hold Biya accountable for the various atrocities that his troops have committed (and continue to commit) in the Anglophone Regions of Cameroon.227
There is no question that the impunity of President Paul Biya and members
of his government has contributed significantly to the destruction of the rule
of law in Cameroon. The rule of law cannot function effectively in a country
if its top leaders do not recognize the supremacy of law but instead place
themselves above the law. It is not likely that a significant part of the population of a country would voluntarily accept and respect the law if their political
leaders, including especially the president, place themselves above the law
and act with impunity. And, without voluntary acceptance and respect of, as
well as fidelity to, the law by a majority of citizens, it would be virtually impossible to maintain the rule of law.
In his discussion of the rule of law, Lord Bingham argued that “all persons
and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by
and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and
publicly administered in the courts.”228 When Lord Bingham mentioned “all
persons,” he did not make any exceptions. In fact, other contributors to the
legal literature and jurisprudence on the rule of law have stated that in a country where the rule of law is guaranteed, “[t]he law is superior to all members
of society, including government officials vested with either executive, legislative, or judicial power.”229
The A.B.A. has argued that “[t]he rule of law does not depend on a U.S.style separation of powers . . . . The key point is that every form of government has to have some system to ensure that no one in the government has so
much power that they can act above the law.”230 Unfortunately, for African
countries with imperial or reinforced presidencies, such as Cameroon, the
president has been granted enough power to act above the law. Hence, government impunity, including especially that by the president, is a major threat
to the rule of law in African countries.

and Supplement some Provisions of Law No. 96–6 of 18 January 1996 to Amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972, art. 53(3) (Cameroon).
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See id.
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Mbaku, Struggle Against Impunity, supra note 5, at 96.
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Id.
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BINGHAM, supra note 80, at 5.
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Stein, supra note 88, at 302 (emphasis added).
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See What is the Rule of Law, supra note 114.
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C. The Military Coup as a Challenge to the Rule of Law
As colonies in Africa gained independence and formed new sovereign
states, the military coup emerged as one of the most important threats to the
maintenance of the rule of law, as well as to peace and security in these new
countries. The first military coup d’état in an independent African country
took place in Egypt on July 23, 1952 when members of the Free Officers
Movement overthrew King Farouk.231 Although Nasser was the brains behind
the coup, General Muhammad Naguib, a co-leader of the coup, was asked to
take leadership of the movement and post-coup government because Nasser
feared that he and his fellow soldiers might not be considered serious leaders
because of their youth.232 However, two years later, Nasser ousted Naguib and
assumed the presidency of Egypt.233
The 1952 Egyptian “revolution” placed the military in a position to remain
an integral part of governance in the country indefinitely. In fact, the country’s
first four presidents were drawn from the military and the present president,
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, is a former military officer who came to power through
a military coup that ousted democratically-elected president, Mohamed
Morsi.234
The Egyptian military coup of 1952 appeared to have paved the way for
the emergence of the coup d’état as a popular method of regime change in
post-independence Africa. It was hoped that the push from both internal and
external forces for transition to democratic governance that began in the continent in the mid-1980s would provide each African country with institutional
arrangements that were capable of enhancing constitutionalism and preventing military officers from intervening in national politics.235 In fact, after the
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See GORDON, supra note 31, at 4, 57–59 (examining the Egyptian coup of 1952 and
the role played by Nasser’s Free Officers). The Free Officers Movement was led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamel Abdel Nasser. The coup was also referred to as the July Revolution. Although the coup makers’ initial aim was simply to oust King Farouk, the coup
eventually grew into a movement with more broader objectives, which included the abolition of the constitutional monarchy, establishment of a republic, putting an end to British
occupation of the country, and seeking the independence of Sudan, which had been governed as an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. The post-coup government was a revolutionary
one that promoted Arab nationalism and opposed imperialism. See STEVEN A. COOK, THE
STRUGGLE FOR EGYPT: FROM NASSER TO TAHRIR SQUARE 38–40 (2012).
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GORDON, supra note 31, at 59.
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COOK, supra note 231, at 56.
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See, e.g., ERIC TRAGER, ARAB FALL: HOW THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD WON AND LOST
EGYPT IN 891 DAYS 225 (2016) (examining the rise and fall of Mohamed Morsi, in Egypt).
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See, e.g., John Makum Mbaku, Constitutionalism and the Transition on Democratic
Governance in Africa, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE
CONTINUING STRUGGLE 103, 113 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere
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fall of the racially-based apartheid regime in South Africa and the subsequent
introduction, through a progressive constitution, of a non-racial democratic
system, there was renewed interest throughout Africa in constitutional government and constitutionalism.236
As authoritarian regimes collapsed and gave way to the establishment of
more democratic, participatory, and inclusive governance systems, it was generally believed that the era of the military coup or non-constitutional regime
change had finally come to an end. Unfortunately, the governing processes
that emerged in many African countries in the post-1990s period were not
capable of fully and effectively constraining the military and preventing its
officers from acting opportunistically and intervening in government. In addition, in countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and The Gambia, military elites who had come to power through force
turned themselves into civilian presidents through carefully controlled elections.237 Through this process, the military remained an integral part of governance in these countries and continued to engage in practices that were antithetical to the rule of law and constitutional government.
For example, Blaise Compaoré, who came to power in Burkina Faso
through a military coup in 1987, carefully manipulated his country’s transition
to democracy and turned himself into a civilian ruler.238 He and his ruling
coalition, the Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire/Mouvement du
Travail (ODP/MT), subsequently drafted and adopted a new constitution that
introduced multiparty competition.239 Nevertheless, “repression of political
dissidents (including many university students) continued, and government
control over preelection campaigning and media led opposition parties to boycott the December 1991 presidential elections.”240 Through the manipulation
of the electoral process, as well as the use of various methods of repression,
Compaoré remained in office until he was forced out by a popular youth revolt
in October 2014.241 As a consequence, the transition to democratic
eds., 2003) (examining the transition to democratic governance that began in various African countries in the mid-1980s).
236
See, e.g., PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE: THE END OF APARTHEID AND
THE BIRTH OF THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA (1997) (examining the demise of apartheid and the
evolution of a new non-racial democracy in South Africa).
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See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA 210 (Kwame Anthony Appiah & Henry Louis
Gates, Jr. eds., 2010) (examining political developments in Burkina Faso).
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See, e.g., Ken Opalo, Burkina Faso’s Silver Lining, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 1, 2014),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/01/burkina-fasos-silver-lining/ (noting that after Blaise
Compaoré came to power in Burkina Faso through a military coup in 1987, he legitimized
his rule through a series of five elections).
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dandc.eu/en/article/burkinabe-youth-united-end-rule-president-blaise-compaore (examining the role played by young people in the ouster of Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in
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governance in Burkina Faso was still-born and the country failed to provide
itself with a governing process undergirded by the rule of law or constitutionalism.
Lieutenant Yahya Jammeh came to power in The Gambia after overthrowing the government of Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara on July 22, 1994.242 Sir Jawara had served as The Gambia’s Prime Minister from independence (February 18, 1965) to 1970 and as President from 1970 to 1994.243 Jammeh’s coup
was considered an “outlier event” for a region that, since the early-1990s, had
been moving away from “unconstitutional forms of regime change, such as
the military coup.”244 The Gambia gained independence from Great Britain
on February 18, 1965 and, prior to 1989, was one of only a few countries in
the West Africa region that could boast of a functioning democratic political
system.245
After the 1994 coup, Jammeh and other members of the Armed Forces
Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) went on to destroy The Gambia’s opportunity to develop and sustain a governing process undergirded or characterized by adherence to the rule of law and the practice of constitutionalism.246
In fact, Jammeh remained in power as President of The Gambia until he was
forced out in 2017.247 On December 1, 2016, The Gambia held presidential
elections in which incumbent Jammeh was a candidate for re-election. When
preliminary results of the election were released on December 2, 2016, it was
determined that Jammeh had lost to Adama Barrow of the Coalition 2016.248
In a statement on national television following the announcement of the results, Jammeh conceded to and congratulated the winner.249
However, on December 9, 2016, Jammeh changed his mind and told the
nation that he would not accept the results of the December 1, 2016 electoral
exercise and that he would not vacate the office of the president of The

2014).
242
See Abdoulaye S. Saine, The Military and “Democratization” in The Gambia: 19942002, in POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM
COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 179 (Julius O. Ihonvbere & John Mukum Mbaku eds., 2003).
243
Id.
244
Mbaku, supra note 33, at 167.
245
ABDOULAYE SAINE, EBRIMA J. CEESAY & EBRIMA SALL, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE
GAMBIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE: 1965–2012 (2013) (noting that from independence in 1965
until the military coup in 1994, The Gambia enjoyed a period of constitutional democracy
and political stability).
246
See Mbaku, supra note 33, at 167.
247
See id. at 169–70.
248
See id. at 168.
249
See Ruth Maclean & Emma Graham-Harrison, The Gambia’s President Jammeh Concedes Defeat in Election, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2
016/dec/02/the-gambia-president-jammeh-concede-defeat-in-election.
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Gambia.250 Claiming that there had been several irregularities in the election,
he called for new elections.251 Jammeh’s unwillingness to leave office was
condemned by many civil society organizations in The Gambia, as well as the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African
Union (“AU”).252 Although the diplomatic missions of many countries in The
Gambia’s capital city Banjul, as well as several African heads of state, pleaded
with Jammeh to leave office and allow the transition to proceed, he refused.253
Jammeh was, however, eventually forced out of office with the help of a military force from ECOWAS called ECOMIG.254 Subsequently, the country’s
democratically elected President, Adama Barrow, was able to return to the
country from Senegal. Since then, he has been working hard to return constitutionalism and the rule of law to The Gambia.255
The late Victor T. Le Vine, a scholar of African political economy, examined the challenges presented to constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa
by military coups. He concluded that “[o]verall, in both francophone and anglophone West Africa, it was the military régimes that epitomized the low
estate to which constitutionalism had fallen during 1963–89.”256 He continued
and stated:
Not only did they [i.e., the military] commit acts which in
themselves amply spoke to their disdain of the rule of law, but
after taking power, they frequently suspended or discarded existing constitutions, to be removed from sight as offensive
remnants of previous régimes, and then (more often than not
in order to help legitimise [sic] their own rule) proceeded to
write new ones to suit themselves.257
In general, military coups either beget more military intervention, as occurred, for example, in Nigeria, or the military who took control of the apparatus of government through force went on to maintain governmental regimes
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See James Doubek, In Reversal, Gambian President Rejects Loss and Calls for New
Election, NPR (Dec. 10, 2016, 3:44PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/12
/10/505103338/in-reversal-gambian-president-rejects-loss-and-calls-for-new-election.
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Id.
252
See Mbaku, supra note 33, at 169.
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Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG), AFRICAN UNION, https://www.aftrica-eu-partners
ship.org/en/projects/mission-gambia-ecomig (last visited Nov. 19, 2019).
254
Id. ECOMIG stands for Economic Community of West African States Mission in The
Gambia.
255
Id.
256
Le Vine, supra note 25, at 190.
257
Id. Such military opportunism occurred in Nigeria (1967, 1976, 1984); Dahomey/Benin (1968, 1977); Upper Volta/Burkina Faso (1970, 1977); Congo People’s Republic
(1973); Mali (1974); The Central African Empire (1974); Mauritania (1978, 1981). See id.
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that adhered neither to the rule of law nor to constitutionalism. As argued by
Le Vine, “[e]ven when the armed forces intervened ostensibly to ‘save’ or
‘uphold’ a constitution—as in Ghana in 1966, or in Nigeria in 1975/6—their
own vision tended to be strictly utilitarian; that is, seeing constitutions as conditional charters to ‘clean’ and ‘sanitize’ civilian régimes.”258 African military
plotters who seek to overthrow the government “place [themselves] outside
the law and . . . show contempt for institutions or authorities.”259 Minabere
Ibelema has noted that “[w]ith few exceptions, military coups in Africa were
met with press and popular support. Coup announcements typically engender
widespread jubilation on the streets and fawning editorials in newspapers.”260
He went on to argue that “[t]he primary reason is that when people are in
economic distress or under political turmoil, the natural tendency is to seek a
messiah to deliver them.”261 However, as argued by Mbaku:
Contrary to the pronouncements of these military elites in the
immediate aftermath of the coups, which included claims that
they had intervened to save the country from corrupt and opportunistic civilian-led regimes, the military regimes were,
more often than not, characterized by levels of corruption and
other forms of impunity that were actually higher than those
obtaining in the civilian regimes that the military had overthrown.262
Since the Free Officers Movement took control of the government of
Egypt in 1952, the military coup and military elites have remained an important part of political economy in many African countries.263 In addition to
the fact that military rule has stunted economic growth and development, it
has also had a significantly negative impact on political development. In fact,
African countries whose political systems have been dominated and controlled by military elites (whether in or out of uniform) have not been able to
promote the rule of law and the practice of constitutional government.264
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Id. Le Vine also notes that “[m]ilitary régimes which promised to restore civilian rule
tended officially, at least initially, to ostracize the politicians they had replaced, declaring
that they were now searching, Diogenes-like, for les hommes valables, ‘the good men who
could run morally irreproachable, effective governments.’” Id. at 190 n. 18.
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ROBERT H. JACKSON & CAR. G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK AFRICA: PRINCE,
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MINABERE IBELEMA, THE AFRICAN PRESS, CIVIC CYNICISM, AND DEMOCRACY 130
(2008).
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Id. at 130.
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Mbaku, supra note 33, at 95.
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D. The Constitutional Coup as a Threat to the Rule of Law
In recent years, another type of coup, which does not involve the military,
has emerged as a major threat to the rule of law and constitutional government
in African countries. This is called the constitutional coup and it “involves the
amending or revising of the constitution to eliminate presidential term limits,
and allows the incumbent to [unconstitutionally] extend his mandate.”265
Mbaku has extended this definition to include additional constitutional
changes, which not only can extend the incumbent’s stay in power, “but also
[have] the potential of: ‘“(1) eliminating opponents to the regime and their
organizations; (2) silencing regime critics; (3) minimizing political competition; and (4) generally supporting regime impunity.’”266
Mbaku then goes on to provide what he argues is a more comprehensive
and robust definition of the constitutional coup. He states that a:
constitutional coup is evidenced by revision or amendment of
the constitution to: (1) eliminate presidential term limits; (2)
eliminate presidential age limits; (3) change citizenship requirements for candidates to the position of president—such a
change is expected to invalidate the eligibility of opposition
candidates; (4) change residency requirements for candidates
to the position of president; and (5) grant the incumbent president immunity from prosecution for crimes committed while
in power.267
Constitutional coups, argues Mbaku, also include:
(1) manipulating the interpretation of constitutional provisions
to postpone elections indefinitely and allow the incumbent
265

Id. at 141–42.
Id. at 142.
267
Id. For example, in 2008, President of the Republic of Cameroon, Paul Biya, had the
country’s constitution changed to immunize him from all crimes committed while in office.
See Joshua Norman, The World’s Enduring Dictators: Paul Biya, Cameroon, CBS NEWS
(June 19, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-worlds-enduring-dictators-paul-biya
-cameroon-19-06-2011/. President Yoweri Museveni, who has ruled Uganda for more than
30 years, was ineligible to participate in presidential elections due to take place in 2021
because of a 75-year limit for presidential candidates. Elias Biryabarema, Uganda’s Museveni Signs Law Removing Age Cap for President, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.re
uters.com/article/us-uganda-polititcs/ugandas-museveni-signs-law-removing-age-cap-forpresident-idUSKBN1ER1CY. Nevertheless, in 2018, he had a compliant parliament
change the constitution to allow him to stand for the presidency in 2021 despite the fact
that he will be 76 in 2021. Id. Earlier in 2005, the same compliant parliament had changed
the constitution to remove a limit of two five-year terms, which had prevented Museveni
from standing for a third term as president. Id.
266
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whose mandate has expired to unconstitutionally stay in
power;268 (2) manipulating electoral and other laws in order to
disqualify political opponents and extend the incumbent’s
mandate or ensure an electoral win for the incumbent; and (3)
changing the electoral laws to disqualify other candidates for
the presidency.269
In 1996, then President of the Republic of Zambia, Frederick J. Chiluba,
changed the constitution to disqualify the candidacy of former and independence president, Kenneth David Kaunda, in the presidential election that was
scheduled for November 18, 1996.270 Chiluba and the ruling Movement for
Multiparty Democracy (“MMD”) changed the constitution to require that all
candidates for the presidency of the Republic of Zambia have parents who
were both Zambians by birth.271 President Chiluba, the MMD and those Zambians who engineered the constitutional amendments were quite aware of the
fact that, although Kaunda was a Zambian citizen who had led the country to
independence in 1964 and had served as president from 1964 to 1991, his
parents were born in what was then the British colony of Nyasaland and which
gained independence as Malawi on July 6, 1964. Under the amended constitution, Kaunda was not eligible to participate in the 1996 election as a candidate for the presidency.272

268
Joseph Kabila took office as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
ten days after the assassination of his father, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, in January
2001. Joseph Kabila, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA, https://www.britannica.com/biogra
phy/Joseph-Kabila (last visited Nov. 19, 2019). He was subsequently elected President of
the DRC in 2006 and re-elected in 2011 for a second term. Id. However, the second term
was supposed to expire on December 20, 2016, as mandated by the Constitution of the
Democratic Republic of Congo, which had been adopted in 2006. Id. Elections were supposed to be held in November 2016 to select his successor but on September 29, 2016, an
electoral commission controlled by Kabila announced that the election would not be held
until early 2018. Id. The delayed election allowed Kabila to unconstitutionally extend his
mandate and remain in office until 2019. See Mo Ibrahim & Alan Doss, Congo’s Election:
a Defeat for Democracy, a Disaster for the People, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2019/feb/09/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-elec
tion-a-defeat-for-democracy-disaster-for-people-mo-ibrahim; see also John Mukum
Mbaku, The Postponed DRC Elections: The Major Players for 2018, BROOKINGS INST.
(Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2016/12/02/the-postponed
-drc-elections-the-major-players-for-2018/.
269
Mbaku, supra note 33, at 142.
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See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, Citizenship Laws and Political and Economic Participation in Africa, 43 N.C.J. INT’L L. 110, 114–15 (2018).
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Id. at 115.
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Id. at 115; see CONST. OF ZAMBIA (1996) § 34(3)(b).
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Félix Houphouët-Boigny ruled Côte d’Ivoire from independence in 1960
until his death in office on December 7, 1993.273 After his death, there was a
power struggle between Henri Konan Bédié, who at the time was the President
of the National Assembly, and Alassane Ouattara, who was the country’s
Prime Minister.274 Bédié won and assumed the position of interim President
of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and Ouattara resigned as Prime Minister on
December 9, 1993.275 In preparation for presidential elections, which were
scheduled for October 22, 1995 to select an individual to serve as the country’s permanent president, Bédié changed the electoral code.276 The new electoral code required that a candidate for the presidency was required to have
parents who were Ivorian citizens by birth.277 At the time, it was generally
believed that the parents of then Prime Minister, Alassane Ouattara, were born
in Burkina Faso.278 As a consequence, under the new electoral code, Ouattara
was not qualified to participate in the October 22, 1995 presidential elections.279
Bédié eventually won the 1995 election and went on to become the President of Côte d’Ivoire.280 However, his government was overthrown through a
military rebellion that began on December 24, 1999.281 Out of the chaotic military rebellion emerged General Robert Guéï, who was Bédié’s Chief of Staff,
to lead the nation.282 Guéï eventually formed a relatively inclusive government, which included members of the opposition.283 Nevertheless, Guéï and
his government soon turned to xenophobia, especially against immigrants and
their descendants, many of whom were Muslim and supporters of the main
opposition leader, Ouattara.284 In 2000, Guéï’s government produced a new
constitution, which was approved by a referendum that was held during the
period July 23–24, 2000.285 The new constitution codified the requirements
273
Kenneth B. Noble, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, Ivory Coast’s Leader Since Freedom in
1960, is Dead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/08/obituarie
s/felix-houphouet-boigny-ivory-coast-s-leader-since-freedom-in-1960-is-dead.html.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 124–124; see also CONSTITUTION DE LA CÔTE D’IVOIRE, July 23, 2010, art. 35
(Ivory Coast). Article 35 states that “[Le candidat à l’élection présidentielle] doit être ivoirien d’origine, né de père et de mère eux-mêmes ivoiriens d’origine” ([The presidential candidate] must be of Ivorian origin, born of a mother and father who are themselves of Ivorian
origin).
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for presidential candidates that were introduced into the electoral code by the
Bédié government.286 As a result, Alassane Ouattara was ruled ineligible for
participation in the presidential election that was scheduled for October 22,
2000.287
In 2019, an Egyptian Parliament made up primarily of supporters of President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, approved a menu of proposed constitutional
amendments that would allow el-Sisi to remain in power until 2034.288 In addition to providing el-Sisi with the right to remain in office for fifteen more
years, the new constitutional amendments would also “further enshrine the
authority of the [Egyptian] Armed Forces in ‘maintaining the foundations of
the civil state.’”289 During the last few decades or so, several African presidents, including those of Algeria (Abdelaziz Bouteflika), Burkina Faso
(Blaise Compaoré), Burundi (Pierre Nkurunziza); Cameroon (Paul Biya),
Chad (Idriss Déby), Gabon (Omar Bongo), Namibia (Sam Nujoma), Niger
(Tandja Mamadou), Rwanda (Paul Kagame), Togo (Étienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma), Tunisia (Zine el Abidine Ben Ali), Uganda (Yoweri Museveni), and
Zambia (Frederick Chiluba), have changed or attempted to amend their national constitutions to remain in office indefinitely.290 It appears that the constitutional coup remains a major threat to the rule of law in Africa.
E. Political Interference with the Judiciary
Another important threat to the rule of law in Africa is the failure of many
countries to constitutionally guarantee judicial independence. In fact, many
national executives and other political elites regularly interfere with the functioning of the judiciary in “a fair, rational, objective and predictable manner.”291 As a consequence, many judicial decisions are influenced
286
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tensions-in-constitution.html (noting that, despite promises from el-Sisi that he would not
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significantly by political considerations. For example, in 1996, Cameroon
amended its constitution and introduced separation of powers, with what was
supposed to be an independent judiciary. Article 37 deals with judicial power
and states that “[j]udicial power shall be exercised by the Supreme Court,
Courts of Appeal and Tribunals. The Judicial Power shall be independent of
the executive and legislative powers.”292 However, the same constitution also
grants the President of the Republic, one of the three branches of government,
the power to guarantee judicial independence.293
The President of the Republic of Cameroon is expected to guarantee the
independence of judicial power by appointing “members of the bench and of
the legal department”294 and by taking “disciplinary action against judicial and
legal officers.”295 Despite these constitutional provisions, argues Charles
Manga Fombad, an expert on Cameroon constitutional law, the President of
the Republic of Cameroon continues to “appoint, transfer, dismiss, suspend
and can interfere with the so-called judicial power with no constitutional provisions to control and ensure that this is done in a fair, rational, objective and
predictable manner.”296 In addition, Cameroon’s Supreme Court, which is the
country’s highest court, is located within the Ministry of Justice, which is a
“cabinet department within the Presidency of the Republic, and thus, under
the control of the executive.”297
In its 2018 report on human rights in Cameroon, the U.S. Department of
State notes that “[d]espite the [Cameroon] judiciary’s partial independence
from the executive and legislative branches, the president [of the Republic of
Cameroon] appoints all members of the bench and legal department of the
judicial branch, including the president of the Supreme Court, and may

54, 68 (1998). At a workshop held in Pretoria, South Africa, on “Challenges to the Rule of
Law in Africa” from April 12 to 13, 2016, and designed to help “identify the challenges
that confront the African Union (AU) Member States with respect to the rule of law,” participants agreed that “an independent judiciary is vital for the rule of law.” See INT’L INST.
FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, CHALLENGES TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA
7, 19 (2016), https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/challenges-rule-law-africa. One
participant in the workshop, Professor André Mbata Mangu, made reference to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where, he argued, the majority of citizens do not “understand or
appreciate a constitution, relative to the authority exercised by an individual, such as the
president.” Id. at 19.
292
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, 1996 art. 37(2) (emphasis added).
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dismiss them at will.”298 The U.S. Department of State report states further
that Cameroon’s “court system is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, which
in turn is under the president.”299 In addition, “[t]he constitution designates
the president as ‘first magistrate,’ thus ‘chief’ of the judiciary, making him
the legal arbiter of any sanctions against the judiciary.”300 Although the constitution states that “[m]agistrates of the bench shall, in the discharge of their
duties, be governed only by the law and their conscience,”301 it is often the
case that in some legal matters that come before a court, judges are “subordinate to the minister of justice or to the minister in charge of military justice.”302 For example, “[w]ith approval from the minister of justice, the Special Criminal Court may drop charges against a defendant who offers to pay
back the money he is accused of having embezzled, which essentially renders
the act of corruption free of sanctions.”303
As argued by Fombad, all of Cameroon’s executives304 have been in total
control of the judicial branch of government, and they have been able to do so
through their ability to appoint and dismiss judicial officers as well as control
the budgets of the judiciary.305 In addition, Fombad argues that in Cameroon,
the judiciary functions essentially as “allies and partners of the executive in
enjoying the spoils of power.”306 He provides an example of how the executive manipulates and controls the judiciary, especially during elections.
In Cameroon, argues Fombad, “[j]udges preside over the divisional election supervisory and vote-counting commissions which tabulate election results, which are then sent to the national vote-counting commission.”307 The
298

U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, supra note 24.
Id.
300
Id.
301
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON, 1996 art. 37(2).
302
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Since the founding of the Republic of Cameroon in 1961, the country has had only
two executives—Ahmadou Ahidjo (1961–1982) and Paul Biya (1982–present) (2019). See
Kehbuma Langmia, Social Media Technology and the 2011 Presidential Election in Cameroon, in MEDIA ROLE IN AFRICAN CHANGING ELECTORAL PROCESS: A POLITICAL
COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE 111, 113 (Cosmas Uchenna Nwokeafor & Kehbuma Langmia eds., 2013) (noting, inter alia, that “since gaining independence from their French and
English colonial masters, Cameroon has had only two presidents”: the first was Ahmadou
Ahidjo and the second was Paul Biya); ABRAHAM KICHA, RESCUING AFRICAN MARRIAGES
IN THE DIASPORA 28 (noting, inter alia, that “[s]ince independence, Cameroon has had only
two presidents” and that “Ahmadou Ahidjo was the first” and “Paul Biya [was] his successor” and “current leader” of the country).
305
See Charles M. Fombad, Endemic Corruption in Cameroon: Insights on Consequences and Control, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM
COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES 234, 247 (Kempe Ronald Hope & Bamwell C. Chikulo, eds.,
2000).
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Supreme Court, which is under the control of the Ministry of Justice—a cabinet department within the Presidency of the Republic—”verifies and proclaims [the] results” of each election.308 During each election, the president
engages in activities that ensure that any election-related disputes resolved by
the judiciary are done so in his favor and that of his supporters.309
For example, during the 1996 and 1997 elections, Biya took action that
would ensure that the judiciary remained loyal and resolve any election-related disputes in his favor. He issued a “presidential decree [that] doubled [judicial] salaries, and in the case of Supreme Court judges,” there was an “increase of almost 200 percent” and it came with “numerous perks and
privileges.”310 In addition to the fact that all the judges of the Supreme Court
are appointed by the President of the Republic, “prior to each election there
are judicial promotions, appointments and transfers to ensure that compliant
judges are placed in strategic positions.”311 Rather than serve as a “credible
check” on the exercise of government power, the Cameroon judiciary and its
officers have, instead, functioned essentially “[a]s the malleable instruments
of politicians who are the most prominent purveyors of corruption.”312
Cameroon, of course, is not an exception when it comes to the lack of effective independence by the judiciary. Throughout the continent, the judicial
systems of many African countries are not able to function independently of
the executive branch of government. Specifically, judges in the judicial systems of many African countries do not have “security of tenure,” “financial
security,” or “institutional independence,” which are very important elements
of judicial independence.313 In Valente v. The Queen, the Supreme Court of
Canada defined minimum requirements for judicial independence: these are
(1) “security of tenure,” (2) “financial security” free from “arbitrary interference by the Executive in a manner that could affect judicial independence,”
and “institutional independence with respect to the judicial function . . . [and]
judicial control over the administrative decisions that bear directly and immediately on the exercise of the judicial function.”314
But, what about the reforms that began in the continent in the early-1990s?
Did they not enhance judicial independence in many countries on the continent? Many of the African countries that engaged in institutional reforms in
the early-1990s actually provided themselves with constitutions that guarantee the independence of the judiciary.315 Post-apartheid South Africa was one
308
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of the countries that undertook reforms to provide itself with a new constitution and one that provided for separation of powers with judicial independence. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (No. 108 of 1996)
states that
(1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the
courts.
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which they must apply impartially and
without fear, favor or prejudice.
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts.
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures,
must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence,
impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the
courts.
(5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to
whom and organs of state to which it applies.316
In addition to the fact that South Africa’s constitution guarantees judicial
independence, the country’s highest court, the Constitutional Court (CC), has
recognized the independence of the judiciary in several of its rulings. The CC
has held that “judicial independence . . . is foundational to and indispensable
for the discharge of the judicial function in a constitutional democracy based
on the rule of law.”317 In its ruling in De Lange v. Smuts, the CC endorsed the
view expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case Valente v. The
Queen regarding judicial independence.318 In another case, the CC held that:
The Constitution thus not only recognises [sic] that courts are
independent and impartial, but also provides important institutional protection for courts. The provisions of section 165,
forming part of the Constitution that is the supreme law, apply
78); Uganda (Articles 126 & 128); and Zambia (Article 91). See CONSTITUTION OF GHANA
1992, art. 125, 127; CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA Feb 9, 1990, art 78; CONSTITUTION OF
UGANDA 1995, art. 126, 128; CONSTITUTION OF ZAMBIA (1996) § 91. See also H. Kwasi
Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of Constitutionalism in
Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1304–1307 (2006).
316
See S. AFR. CONST., 1996.
317
De Lange v. Smuts (1998) (3) SA 785 (CC), para. 59 (S. Afr.).
318
Id. at paras. 70, 73.
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to all courts and judicial officers, including magistrates’ courts
and magistrates. These provisions bind the judiciary and the
government and are enforceable by the superior courts, including this Court.319
Through its rulings, the CC has clarified the nature of judicial independence in the country. It has made clear that judicial independence has two important dimensions, namely, (1) individual independence, which mandates
that when judges adjudicate cases, they must act independently and impartially; and (2) institutional independence, which requires that the country provide “specific structures and guarantees . . . so that judicial officers and the
courts are adequately protected against interference from external actors.”320
External actors include other branches of government—for example, the executive, who is likely to come before the courts.321
South Africa’s post-apartheid judiciary has, in its rulings, exercised a significant level of independence. When the judiciary has been called upon to
check the exercise of government power, it has done so without succumbing
to political pressure. For example, shortly after then President of the Republic
of South Africa, Jacob Zuma, took unilateral action322 to withdraw the country
from the International Criminal Court (ICC), a civil society organization, and
the country’s main opposition political party to the ruling African National
Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA), argued that the decision to
withdraw South Africa from the Rome Statute of the ICC was unconstitutional
because the South African Parliament was not consulted as required by the
national constitution.323 The DA subsequently initiated legal action to force
the government to abandon its effort to withdraw South Africa from the Rome
Statute.324
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Specifically, the DA argued that “[t]he notice of withdrawal [was] in
breach of section 231 of the Constitution [of South Africa, 1996], as it was
delivered without first securing a resolution of Parliament authorizing withdrawal from the Rome Statute.”325 On February 22, 2017, the Gauteng Division of the South African High Court at Pretoria held, in the case Democratic
Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others
(Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening),
that the president did not have the authority to terminate an existing international agreement and ordered the government to revoke the notice of withdrawal.326 Specifically, the court held that “the decision of the executive to
deliver the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the ICC without the
requisite prior parliamentary approval violated section 231 of the South African Constitution and was a breach of the principle of separation of powers.”327
Subsequently, on March 7, 2017, the government of South Africa accepted
the court ruling and revoked the notice of withdrawal from the Rome Statute.328
In the violence that gripped Kenya in the aftermath of the presidential election in December 2007, the country engaged in constitutional discourse to
produce a new constitution.329 The result of this nation-wide reform effort is
the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010.330 That constitution provided
for the separation of powers with an independent judiciary.331 It states that
“[i]n the exercise of judicial authority, the Judiciary . . . shall be subject only
to this Constitution and the law shall not be subject to the control or direction
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of any person or authority.”332 The Constitution also granted the Supreme
Court the power to answer all questions related to the validity of presidential
elections. Specifically, the Constitution states as follows:
(1) A person may file a petition in the Supreme Court to challenge the election of the President-elect within seven days after
the date of the declaration of the results of the presidential
election.
(2) Within fourteen days after the filing of a petition under
clause (1), the Supreme Court shall hear and determine the petition and its decision shall be final.333
On August 8, 2017, general elections were held in Kenya to elect the President, members of Parliament, and officials for various sub-national governments.334 The official results showed that incumbent president, Uhuru Kenyatta, had been re-elected with 54.27 percent of the votes cast.335 The main
opposition leader, Raila Odinga, received 44.74 percent of the votes.336
Shortly after the results were released, Odinga argued that the election had
been marred with many irregularities and that the results were “hacked and
rigged in favour [sic] of the incumbent” (i.e., Uhuru Kenyatta).337 Odinga and
his supporters subsequently took their case to the Supreme Court.338 On September 1, 2017, the Supreme Court rendered its historic decision in which it
stated that the electoral commission had “failed, neglected, or refused to conduct the presidential election in a manner consistent with the dictates of the
Constitution.”339 And, in accordance with § 140(3) of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court ordered that “a fresh election shall be held within sixty days”
to select a new President-elect.340 The September 1, 2017 ruling by the Kenya
332
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Supreme Court was considered very important because it was the first time in
the history of independent Kenya that the courts had successfully stood up to
what had, since independence, evolved into an imperial presidency.341
The independence exhibited by the Constitutional Court in South Africa
and the Supreme Court of Kenya has contributed significantly to the gradual
evolution of a culture of adherence to the rule of law in these countries. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in many other countries on the continent. Although many of them have constitutions that guarantee judicial independence, these guarantees remain essentially parchment barriers to the abuse
of executive power, which, unfortunately, do not have any practical effects.
The Founders of the American Republic recognized this problem, that is, that
parchment barriers alone cannot protect government tyranny; there must exist
a robust and effective governing process, one that adequately guards the government and prevents civil servants and political elites from acting with impunity.342
In her study of judicial independence and its relation to the protection of
human rights, Keith states that many legal scholars and political scientists
have asserted that judicial independence “is the indispensable link in the machinery for securing individual protection against states’ human rights
abuses.”343 Monica Macovei, in a study of the protection of human rights by
the judiciary in Romania, argues that “[a]s a necessary check on the potential
excesses of both the executive and legislative branches, only an independent
and impartial judiciary may effectively guarantee the protection of human
rights.”344
International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the International Bar Association (IBA) recognize the “nexus between the independence of the judiciary and human rights”345 and have produced resolutions
that “enumerate an independent judiciary as one of the essential elements for
safeguarding human rights.”346 In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
UN “has set forth standards for achieving an independent judiciary in its Basic
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Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.”347 Noting that “the U.N.
principles represent a substantial degree of global consensus on what judicial
independence is or should be,”348 Keith constructs “seven ordinal
measures”349 for what can be described as “the seven key constitutional elements necessary to produce an independent judiciary able to safeguard human
rights.”350 These key indicators of judicial independence are (1) a ban against
exceptional or military courts; (2) separation of powers; (3) exclusive authority; (4) finality of decisions; (5) enumerated qualifications; (6) guaranteed
terms; and (7) fiscal autonomy.351
Several legal scholars have studied judicial independence in Nigeria under
the Fourth Republic, which came into being with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999.352 In one such study, Professor Philip Aka
states that “[a] judicial tribunal’s independence breathes life into the liberties
guaranteed for citizens in a national constitution, and promotes human
rights.”353 Aka adds that judicial independence is also “imperative for rooting
the culture of the rule of law.”354 In fact, the ability of the courts to operate
freely and without political interference and deliver justice timely and fairly
directly affects the people’s trust in the law and hence, is a major determinant
of people’s willingness to voluntarily accept, respect, and obey the law.
In every country, judges and the courts are tasked with the responsibility
to make decisions that affect people’s lives, their freedoms, rights, as well as
their property. According to the UN’s Basic Principles on the Independence
of the Judiciary, “judges are charged with the ultimate decision over life, freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens.”355 Unless the judiciary is independent of outside influence and interference, it is not likely that it would be
able to successfully carry out or undertake these duties.
In his study of judicial independence in Nigeria, Professor Aka uses the
seven indicators of judicial independence developed by Keith to determine the
extent to which the judiciary in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic is independent. The
ban against exceptional or military courts prohibits the trial of citizens by
347

Id. These principles were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1985 through Resolution 40/32 of November 29, 1985 and Resolution 40/146 of December 13, 1985. See
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Preamble, U.N. G.A. Res. 40/32
(Nov. 29, 1985) and 40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985) [hereinafter Basic Principles on Judicial Independence].
348
Keith, supra note 343, at 196.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
Id. at 196–97.
352
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1999). This was the constitution that marked the end of
military rule and ushered in what was expected to be a democratic dispensation.
353
Philip Aka, Judicial Independence Under Nigeria’s Fourth Republic: Problems and
Prospects, 45 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2014).
354
Id.
355
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, supra note 347.

2020]

THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA

351

extraordinary tribunals and this is in accordance with the Basic Principles on
Judicial Independence that “[e]veryone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals using established legal procedures.”356 Specifically,
“[t]ribunals that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process
shall not be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary
courts or judicial tribunals.”357 Aka argues that this right, as stated in the Basic
Principles on Judicial Independence, is “the testament that the people, rather
than solely the judges, are the ultimate beneficiaries of judicial independence.”358
In some African countries, one can find “special courts” that are granted
the power to operate without the benefit of “the duly established procedures
of the legal process” and that “displace the jurisdiction belonging to ordinary
courts or judicial tribunals.”359 An example is Cameroon’s Special Criminal
Court (“SCC”), which was created in 2011 to adjudicate cases involving the
embezzlement of public funds and to force those convicted to restore the property stolen.360 Although some scholars have argued that a court, such as Cameroon’s SCC, is “an example to emulate and confirms that corruption can be
fought if and only if the political will to do so is present,”361 others have argued that the SCC, like other judicial institutions in Cameroon, is subject to
manipulation by senior-level civil servants and politicians for their own benefit and that of their benefactors.362
The second key indicator of judicial independence is the separation of
powers, “which requires that the authority of the judicial branch be formally
separated from the authority of the executive and legislative branches, who
must also refrain from taking any steps likely to endanger the independence
of judges.”363 The Basic Principles on Judicial Independence mandate that
“judicial independence [should] ‘be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in
the Constitution or the law of the country.’”364 More importantly, the Basic
356
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Principles on Judicial Independence state that “[i]t is the duty of all governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the
judiciary.”365 Unfortunately, for many African countries, while national constitutions may guarantee judicial independence, civil servants and political
elites in these countries have refused to accept, respect and “observe the independence of the judiciary.”366
It is important, for the sake of enhancing judicial independence, that the
judiciary must not be housed within either the executive or legislative
branches. The judiciary must be housed in a branch that is separate from either
the executive or legislative branch in order to minimize political interference
with the country’s court system. Yet, in Cameroon and many Francophone
countries, the Supreme Court, the country’s highest court, is actually housed
within the Ministry of Justice, a cabinet position within the executive branch
of government. It is no wonder that the president and members of his cabinet
routinely interfere with judicial deliberations and rulings, a process that has
seriously undermined the rule of law in each of these countries.367
The third indicator of judicial independence is that courts be granted “exclusive authority” to adjudicate cases “based on their own competence and
free from unwarranted pressures of any type.”368 The Basic Principles on Judicial Independence mandate that the judiciary be granted exclusive “jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature,” as well as the “exclusive authority to
decide whether an issue submitted for its decision is within its competence as
defined by law.”369 In order for the rule of law to function in a country, the
judiciary must have the authority to deal with all issues of a judicial nature
and, in addition, be granted the authority to determine which matters fall
within the jurisdiction of the courts.
The fourth indicator of judicial independence is the finality of court decisions. This indicates that “decisions of judges [must] not be subject to any
revision outside the appeal procedures by the law.”370 The Basic Principles on
Judicial Independence support this principle, stating that “[t]here shall not be
any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the judicial process, nor
shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to revision.”371
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Interference with the performance of the judicial function by state- and, to
a certain extent, non-state actors, is one of the most important constraints to
the rule of law in African countries. Judges and judicial institutions must be
safeguarded from political interference, which can severely handicap their
ability to perform their functions and contribute to the maintenance of the rule
of law.
The fifth indicator deals with the selection of judicial officers. Those who
serve in positions in the judicial system must be individuals who are fully
qualified as judged by their “professional qualifications, ability, and integrity.”372 While it is important, especially for African countries, that staffing of
the courts reflect the diversity of each country, judicial appointments should
not be based solely on political considerations—individuals who serve in the
judiciary must possess the required professional qualifications and must also
adhere to the rules of professional conduct for lawyers and judges. The International Bar Association (IBA) Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence
provide some advice on what role, if any, the executive should play in the
hiring of judicial officers.373 The IBA Minimum Standards state that “[p]articipation in judicial appointments and promotions by the executive or legislature is not inconsistent with judicial independence provided that appointments and promotions of judges are vested in a judicial body in which
members of judiciary and the legal profession form a majority.”374
Aka argues that the main reason for making certain that judicial officers
are only selected based on “merit factors”375 is to ensure that the judiciary is
staffed only by individuals who can “perform their functions competently, and
who have been socialized to the norms of judicial independence.”376 Such a
caliber of professionals is likely to be able to resist corruption by the executive.
With respect to the disciplining of judges, a process that has been used by
many African presidents to influence their national judiciaries, the IBA states
that “[t]he power to discipline or remove a judge must be vested in an institution, which is independent of the Executive” and that that power “should preferably be vested in a judicial tribunal.”377 The IBA, nevertheless, prescribes a
role for the executive in the disciplining of judicial officers. It states that “[t]he
Executive may participate in the discipline of judges only in referring complaints against judges, or in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, but not
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the adjudication of such matters.”378 More specifically, the IBA states that
“[t]he Executive shall not have control over judicial functions.”379
The sixth indicator of judicial independence requires that the “constitution
guarantees judges’ terms of office, governing their appointment, discipline,
and removal from office.”380 Professor Aka then argues that this indicator is
consistent with provisions of the IBA’s Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, which state that “[t]he position of the judges, their independence,
their security, and their adequate remuneration shall be secured by law,”381
and that the remuneration of judges and other judicial officers shall not “be
decreased during the judges’ services, except as a coherent part of an overall
public economic measure.”382
The last indicator of judicial independence is “fiscal autonomy” and requires that the judiciary be “provided with adequate resources allowing it to
properly perform its functions while insulating it from possible financial retribution of an abusive regime.”383 In order for judicial officers to perform their
functions properly, they must be guaranteed financial security. This is in line
with the minimum requirements for judicial independence defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case Valente v. The Queen.384
After ruling the country for nearly 30 years,385 the Nigerian military produced a new constitution386 and handed the apparatus of government to an
elected civilian regime in 1999.387 Professor Aka has studied judicial
378
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independence in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic and determined the following: the country’s constitution “contains ample provisions relating to judicial independence.”388 Professor Aka then goes on to argue that “[e]ntrenchment of these provisions in the constitution [of Nigeria] as ground norm or
basic law of the land signifies that an independent judiciary is a value that
Nigerians cherish.”389
Professor Aka then uses the seven indicators of judicial independence to
determine the extent to which the provisions of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution
conform with these provisions.390 He concludes that the institutional arrangements of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic meet all the indicators, except that dealing
with fiscal autonomy.391 In analyzing the problems and failures of the judiciary in Nigeria, Okechukwu Oko argues that “[b]oth the appearance and reality
of independence demand that the judiciary should have complete control over
its funds.”392 This speaks directly to one of the minimum requirements for
judicial independence defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case
Valente v. The Queen393 and adopted by the Constitutional Court of South
Africa in the cases De Lange v. Smuts394 and Van Rooyen v. The State.395 In
its ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada identified “financial security” free
from “arbitrary interference by the Executive in a manner that could affect
judicial independence” as one of the minimum requirements for judicial independence.396 This part of judicial independence—that is, financial security—
is provided for in the U.S. Constitution at Article III, section one, which states
that “[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”397
In his study of judicial independence in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, Professor Aka determined that although constitutional provisions seem to guarantee
388
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judicial independence, the reality is that fiscal autonomy is lacking for judges
and the judiciary.398 Rather, “under the Fourth Republic, the President controls funds allocated to the judiciary, impelling judges to ‘depend on the goodwill of the executive branch for funding.’”399 Such financial dependence seriously undermines the ability of the judiciary to function independently and
perform its constitutional duties fairly and without political interference. As
argued by Fombad in the case of Cameroon, control of the judiciary’s finances
by the executive has allowed the latter to turn judges and other judicial officers
into “malleable instruments” for the advancement of the interests of the president and his benefactors.400
Judicial independence in Nigeria is threatened not only by the lack of financial autonomy by the judiciary. The IBA Minimum Standards of Judicial
Independence state that “[j]udicial appointments should generally be for life,
subject to removal for cause and compulsory retirement at an age fixed by law
at the date of appointment.”401 With respect to the removal of a judge, the
Constitution of Nigeria provides the following procedure: “A judicial officer
shall not be removed from his office or appointment before the age of retirement except in the following circumstances—(a) in the case of (i) Chief Justice of Nigeria, . . . by the President acting on an address supported by twothirds majority of the Senate.”402
Just three weeks before Nigeria was to hold a general election in 2019 in
which incumbent president, Muhammadu Buhari, was a candidate for re-election, the president suspended Chief Justice Walter Onnoghen,403 who was facing charges for allegedly failing to declare his personal assets before taking
office in 2017.404 Although this was not an outright dismissal or removal, Justice Onnoghen’s suspension was widely criticized by both internal and external observers for not “following legal procedures” and for not offering the
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Vote, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/world/
articles/2019-01-25/nigeria-president-appoints-acting-chief-justice (noting the suspension
of Nigeria’s Chief Justice three weeks before the presidential election).
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judge an opportunity to fully defend himself.405 Officials from the UN Human
Rights Council argued that the removal of the Chief Justice without substantive due process was “incompatible with the independence of the judiciary”
and violated the spirit of the separation of powers.406
The truth of the matter is that, despite constitutional guarantees, the Nigerian judiciary does not currently enjoy any significant level of independence.
Despite the improvements that have been made since the introduction of democracy in 1999, Nigeria’s judiciary, like many others in Africa, does not
enjoy the type of independence that would allow it to function effectively as
a check on the exercise of government power and advance the rule of law.
F. Understanding and Appreciating the Constitution
The rule of law cannot function effectively in a country if the majority of
citizens do not understand and appreciate the constitution, which is the country’s basic law. Throughout the continent, many people are not aware of their
national constitution, do not understand its provisions or its role in their lives,
and are unable to appreciate the role that the constitution plays in regulating
their socio-political interaction.407 As argued by Professor André Mbata
Mangu, most citizens of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) usually do
not understand the constitution or appreciate it.408 Of course, the situation of
the people of the DRC is not unique. Throughout the continent, many citizens
are not aware that there exists, within their country, a basic law called the
constitution and those who do, do not have firsthand knowledge of its contents, as well as what the role of this basic law is in their daily lives.409
Part of the reason why many citizens of the African countries are usually
not aware of their constitutions or understand and appreciate them is directly
related to the nature of the process through which national constitutions were
designed and adopted. If the constitution-making process is participatory and
inclusive—allowing all stakeholder groups or subcultures to participate—issues that are important to them can become part of constitutional discourse
and hence, could be reflected in the constitution.410 As argued by Mbaku,
“[t]he constitution must be considered by the majority of citizens as a
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See UN Experts Says Suspension of Nigeria’s Chief Judge Breaches Human Rights,
REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-election-un/u-n-exper
t-says-suspension-of-nigerias-chief-judge-breaches-human-rights-idUSKCN1Q00UI.
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See Challenges to the Rule of Law in Africa 22, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY &
ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publicatio
ns/challenges-to-the-rule-of-law-in-africa.pdf.
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Id. at 7, 19.
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Id. at 38.
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negotiated legal mechanism to deal with the complex problems that arise from
their socio-political interaction.”411
Citizens must see the constitution generally and the law in particular, as a
tool designed (i) to protect their rights; and (ii) “to organize their private
lives—for example, to start and run a business for profit, acquire and dispose
of property, get married, engage in contracting, protect one’s values from encroachment by either state or non-state actors, or otherwise engage in productive activities to create wealth.”412 Making certain that the process through
which the constitution and post-constitutional laws are selected is “participatory and inclusive achieves at least two critical objectives.”413 First is “that the
resulting laws are locally-focused and therefore relevant to the lives of the
people whose behaviors the laws are expected to regulate, reflecting their values.”414 Second is “that the laws are those that the people understand, respect,
and are able and willing to obey.”415 Hence, the most effective way to make
sure that the majority of the citizens of each African country voluntarily accept and obey their laws is “to make sure that the process through which laws
are enacted in each country is open and transparent, and that citizens who so
desire can participate fully.”416
An important outcome of openness and transparency is that they can help
citizens “know what the law is, understand the law, and make certain that the
law reflects their values and is relevant to their lives, effectively enhancing
compliance.”417 In addition, if the process through which the constitution, as
well as, post-constitutional laws, is made is open and transparent, “citizens
will be able to understand and appreciate the reason why a specific law has
been enacted and why they must obey it.”418 Thus, openness and transparency
contribute significantly to the ability and willingness of the majority of citizens to voluntarily accept, as well as, understand and appreciate the law, effectively enhancing adherence to the rule of law.
For many African countries, perhaps the most important reason why most
citizens do not understand the provisions of their constitutions, including their
Bill of Rights, is that these documents are written in languages that are alien
to them. The majority of African countries have adopted the languages of their
former colonizers as their official national languages. For example, the official languages of the Republic of Cameroon,419 which at one time was
411
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colonized by France and the United Kingdom, are English and French.420 The
official language of Sierra Leone is English421 and that of Senegal is French.422
The constitutions and laws of these countries are written in their official
languages. Unfortunately, most of the citizens of these African countries are
not literate in their countries’ official languages. As a consequence, it is very
difficult for citizens to be familiar with laws that are written in languages that
they cannot read or understand. In Cameroon, for example, where most government communication is carried out in French, significant parts of the population cannot participate in governance because they can neither speak nor
understand the French language.423
G. Failure to Domesticate Important International Human Rights Instruments
Upholding and protecting the rule of law requires that each African country mainstream international human rights law into national law either by legislation or by amending existing domestic laws where there is a contradiction.424 Unfortunately, throughout the continent, many African countries have
failed to domesticate regional and international legal instruments, especially
those dealing with the recognition and protection of human rights.
It has been argued that “[a]n important consequence of globalization is the
internationalization of constitutional law.”425 African countries, like their
counterparts in other parts of the world, must now make certain that “in constitutional design and interpretation, [they] must take cognizance of international law, particularly international human rights instruments.”426 Alarmed
gained independence on October 1, 1961 and subsequently united with the République du
Cameroun to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. The République du Cameroun was
the former UN Trust Territory of Cameroons under French administration, which gained
independence on January 1, 1960. Later, the name of the united country was changed from
the Federal Republic of Cameroon (République fédérale du Cameroun) to the United Republic of Cameroon (République unie du Cameroun) and then to the Republic of Cameroon
(République du Cameroun). See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 160 (examining a historical overview of present-day Cameroon).
420
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON (1972) art. 1 para. 3.
421
CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE (1991) art. 90 (“The business of Parliament shall be
conducted in the English Language.”).
422
CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU SÉNÉGAL Jan. 22, 2001, art. 1 (“La langue officielle de la République du Sénégal est le Français”).
423
See MBAKU, supra note 61, at 233 (arguing that since unification in 1961, “the French
language has dominated all forms of communication in government and the economy” in
Cameroon).
424
That is, where there is a contradiction between international law and domestic law.
Here, domestic law includes constitutional and customary law.
425
John Mukum Mbaku, International Law and Limits on the Sovereignty of African
States, 30 FLA. J. INT’L L. 43, 43 (2018).
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at the atrocities that were committed during World War II, “the international
community became quite concerned about how national governments treated
or were treating their citizens.”427 As a consequence, when the United Nations
was established in 1945, the global community moved very quickly to establish “minimum standards of human rights protection with monitoring bodies
to scrutinize national performance.”428
The international community eventually incorporated and elaborated these
minimum standards into a UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution and
two treaties that came to be referred to as the International Bill of Human
Rights (IBHR). The IBHR consists of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR),429 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) with its two Optional Protocols,430 and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).431 Although the UDHR
is only a “declaration” and, as a consequence, is not legally binding on Member States of the UN, many of the UDHR’s provisions have been incorporated
into “other international and regional instruments as well as national constitutions.”432 Today, many of the provisions of the UDHR are “considered to express principles of customary international law.”433
International legal scholars have argued that because of the fact that the
provisions of the UDHR are now granted special status by many countries,
these provisions and “other instruments which contain rules considered to be
customary international law are automatically applicable in most common law
countries . . . as part of national law and must therefore be taken into account
in any interpretation of the constitution.”434 It has become imperative for
many countries to consider the “provisions of these international human rights
instruments, including those of the UDHR,” as limits to their sovereignty and
“take them into consideration when interpreting their national constitutions,
as well as when designing their constitutions and enacting post-constitutional
laws.”435
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Nevertheless, these international human rights instruments “do not automatically confer justiciable rights in national courts.”436 However, as argued
by Mbaku, these instruments and standards “do and can have significant impact on national laws, including the constitution, how they are designed and
how they are enforced.”437 The provisions of the constitutions of many African countries “have been substantially influenced by international human
rights instruments and standards.”438 For example, in the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, it is declared as follows:
We, the People of Côte d’Ivoire . . . [r]eaffirm our determination to build a Rule of Law in which human rights, public freedoms, human dignity, justice and good governance as defined
in the international legal instruments to which the Côte
d’Ivoire is a party, in particular the United Nations Charter of
1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 and
its supplementary protocols, the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2001, are promoted, protected and guaranteed.439
Does this affirmation of the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in
the Constitution of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and other African countries
“make [these rights and freedoms] part of national law and hence, make the
rights contained in these international instruments justiciable in national
courts?”440 As argued by Professor Fombad, this affirmation, “does not render
any of these instruments part of national law nor can they be invoked on this
basis alone in the interpretation of the constitution.”441
Let us now consider the Republic of Benin, where the country’s constitutional designers “have directly incorporated provisions of certain international
human rights instruments into the national constitution.”442 In the Preamble to
the Constitution of the Republic of Benin, the people state as follows:
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Mirna E. Adjami, African Courts, International Law, and Comparative Case Law:
Chimera or Emerging Human Rights Jurisprudence?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 103, 108 (2002).
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Mbaku, supra note 425, at 65.
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Fombad, supra note 428, at 445.
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CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE CÔTE D’IVOIRE (2016) pmbl. Note that this is a
translation from the French. Such affirmations can also be found in the constitutions of
other African countries, including, for example, the Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, 1996 (as amended through 2008). CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON
(1996) pmbl.
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WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE . . . [r]eaffirm our attachment
to the principles of democracy and human rights as they have
been defined by the Charter of the United Nations of 1945 and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, by the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in
1981 by the Organization of African Unity and ratified by Bénin on January 20, 1986 and whose provisions make up an integral part of this present Constitution and of Béninese law
and have a value superior to the internal law.443
In addition, Article 7 of the same constitution renders the “rights and duties
proclaimed and guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights . . . an integral part of the . . . Constitution [of Bénin] and of Béninese
law.”444 The Constitution of the Republic of Benin also imposes a duty on the
State “to assure the diffusion and the teaching of the Constitution, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, of the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 as well as all of the international instruments duly
ratified and relative to human rights.”445 The Constitution of the Republic of
Benin makes the provisions of the African Charter directly justiciable in Benin’s domestic courts. The Republic of Benin, hence, has fully domesticated
the provisions of the African Charter.
The Republic of Angola is another African country that has made an effort
to domesticate international human rights instruments. For example, according to Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Angola,
1. The fundamental rights established in this Constitution shall
not exclude others contained in the laws and applicable rules
of international law.
2. Constitutional and legal precepts relating to fundamental
rights must be interpreted and incorporated in accordance with
the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the African
Charter on the Rights of Man and Peoples and international
treaties on the subject ratified by the Republic of Angola.
3. In any consideration by the Angolan courts of disputes concerning fundamental rights, the international instruments
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CONSTITUTION DE LE RÉPUBLIQUE DU BÉNIN (1990) pmbl. (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 7.
Id. at art. 40.
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referred to in the previous point shall be applied, even if not
invoked by the parties concerned.446
Additional elaboration is provided in Article 27 of the Constitution of Angola, which states that “[t]he principles set out in this chapter shall apply to
the rights, freedoms and guarantees and to fundamental rights of a similar nature that are established in the Constitution or are enshrined in law or international conventions.”447 Thus, Angola, like Benin, has made certain provisions
of international human rights instruments directly justiciable in its national
courts.
In the aftermath of post-election violence in Kenya in 2008, the country
embarked on concerted efforts to produce a new constitution, one that was
expected to improve the country’s ability to practice constitutionalism and the
rule of law. The result of Kenya’s constitutional discourse was the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010.448 The new constitution introduced a
separation-of-powers regime with checks and balances, including an independent judiciary.449 Kenya’s new constitution speaks directly to the applicability of international law within the country and in its domestic courts. According to Article 2(5), “[t]he general rules of international law shall form part
of the law of Kenya.”450 This provision effectively renders “the rules of international law” justiciable in Kenyan courts. In addition, Kenya’s constitution
also provides another avenue for domesticating international law, when it
states that “[a]ny treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the
law of Kenya under this Constitution.”451
Unlike Angola, Benin, and Kenya, most African countries do not make
international law part of their constitutional law. Take, for example, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. While the constitution makes
mention of international law, it fails to make provisions of the latter directly
justiciable in the country’s courts. Article 39(1)(b), however, imposes an obligation on national courts to “consider international law” when interpreting
the Bill of Rights.452 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana obligates the
government to “promote respect for international law, treaty obligations
. . . .”453 However, Ghana’s constitution does not make any provisions of international law directly justiciable in its national courts.
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The failure of many countries in Africa to domesticate provisions of international law, including especially those of international human rights instruments, is a threat to the practice of constitutionalism and the rule of law. In
the African countries, domestic or national law includes not just constitutional
and statutory law, but also the customs and traditions of each country’s various subcultures. It has been argued that “part of the effort to develop a culture
of human rights must include the need to make certain that none of the customary and traditional practices of any subculture (e.g., female genital mutilation; virgin cleansing; the conscription of young girls to serve as slaves in
fetish shrines; child marriage) violate provisions contained in various international human rights instruments.”454 In many of these countries, government
impunity is pervasive and individuals (especially members of the government)
who abuse human rights, including those of children, are rarely ever brought
to justice. Where national laws do not reflect the provisions of international
human rights instruments, it is often the case that impunity is pervasive, and,
as a result, there cannot be adherence to the rule of law and/or practice of
constitutional government.455
H. Political and Economic Exclusion and Extreme Poverty
The United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) 2018 report on human development shows that of the thirty poorest and least developed countries in the world, as measured by the human development index (HDI),
twenty-seven or 90 percent of them are found in Africa.456 Among the extremely poor African countries are Central African Republic, South Sudan,
Burundi, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which during
the last several years have not been able to practice constitutionalism. In fact,
most of these countries have been embroiled in either civil war or some form
of sectarian violence. For example, since December 2013, South Sudan has
fought a brutal and bloody civil war that has deepened the “rift between two
[of the country’s] largest ethnic groups—[President] Kiir’s dominant Dinka
and [former Vice President] Machar’s Nuer people.”457
Although Nigeria is not usually considered a poor country, it has surpassed
India as the country that houses the largest population of people living in extreme poverty.458 In 2018, as many as 86.9 million Nigerians were living in
extreme poverty and this number is expected to increase to 120 million by the
454
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year 2030 representing 45.5 percent of the country’s population.459 In terms
of percentages, South Sudan has the highest percentage (93%) of people living
in extreme poverty, followed by DRC (77%), Mozambique (62%), and Zambia (57%).460 It is estimated that by 2030, unless South Sudan can significantly
improve its governance architecture, the percentage of citizens living in extreme poverty is most likely to approximate 100 percent of the country’s population.461
Studies of countries, such as South Sudan, DRC, and Central African Republic, show that the pervasiveness of extreme poverty is related to the existence of ineffective and dysfunctional governance systems, which are characterized by the lack of adherence or fidelity to the rule of law.462 These
countries are generally pervaded by extremely high levels of corruption, especially of the grand type, as state custodians—(i.e., civil servants and political elites) those who control the government—use the power, granted them
by the people through the constitution, to enrich themselves at the expense of
their fellow citizens.
Corruption is a major constraint to the ability of citizens to organize their
private lives and engage in activities to create the wealth that they need to
fight poverty and improve their quality of life.463 This is an especially serious
problem for individuals and groups that historically have been marginalized
and exploited by ruling majority factions. These include women, youth, urban
poor, rural inhabitants, and ethnic and religious minorities. Some of these
groups (e.g., the Anglophones of Cameroon),464 frustrated at their continued
marginalization and permanent existence on the political and economic margins, have resorted to violent mobilization in an effort to either capture the
459
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government or, at the very least, minimize their further marginalization.465
This violent mobilization by groups that are actually marginalized or consider
themselves to be so, has produced the type of political and economic instability that has threatened peace and security and endangered the practice of constitutional government and adherence to the rule of law.466
The World Justice Project (WJP) produces an annual Rule of Law Index
that “presents a portrait of the rule of law in 126 countries by providing scores
and rankings based on eight factors: constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security,
regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and criminal justice.”467 The index
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the strongest level of adherence to the
rule of law.468 Of the 30 countries that show the least level of adherence or
fidelity to the rule of law, 18 (or 60%) of them are found in Africa.469 These
include countries like the DRC, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and
Uganda that are struggling with some form of religious extremism or violent
mobilization by subcultures that consider themselves marginalized and
pushed to the political and economic margins.470
The failure of many African countries to deal fully and effectively with
poverty, including the extreme type, is a major threat to the rule of law. This
is a complex issue because the absence of the rule of law in these countries
stunts entrepreneurship and the creation of the wealth that these countries need
to confront poverty. At the same time, the existence of high levels of poverty
forces many of the poor, who include various minority factions, to engage in
violent mobilization, a situation that creates political instability and further
465
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endangers the practice of constitutional government and adherence to the rule
of law. The key to resolving this governance quagmire lies in institutional
reforms to provide institutional arrangements that are capable of adequately
guarding the government and preventing impunity. That is, each African
country must be provided with a governing process undergirded by adherence
to the rule of law.
V. THE AFRICAN UNION AND THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA
A. Introduction
Shortly after the Organization of African Unity (OAU) came into being in
1963,471 it was generally believed that the continental organization would
help liberate the rest of the continent, accelerate the decolonization process, and help the remaining colonies, including
apartheid South Africa, to gain their independence; promote
democratic governance throughout the continent; advance the
protection of human rights; and provide the enabling institutional environment for the creation of the wealth that was
needed to deal fully and effectively with poverty and promote
economic and human development.472
Although the OAU was aware of and recognized the fact that “freedom,
equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples,”473 the Charter that brought the
organization into being (OAU Charter or Charter) “did not specifically make
the promotion of democracy and good governance one of its purposes or objectives.”474 Instead, the Charter required that Member States adhere to certain
principles, including “[n]on-interference in the internal affairs of [member]
States”475 and “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each
State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.”476
These principles, which were binding on Member States, meant that the
OAU, as a continental organization, “could not intervene to prevent extraconstitutional regime changes, including military coups”477 and other threats
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to peace and security generally and the rule of law in particular. As argued by
some scholars of African political economy, “it was obvious, even to a casual
observer, that military coups were a direct affront and constraint to the maintenance of the type of governance systems that promote many of the ideals (e.g.,
freedom, equality, and justice) that gave impetus to the founding of the
OAU.”478 Perhaps, more importantly, military coups were and still are a major
threat to constitutional government and the rule of law. But, how did the OAU
deal with military coups and other threats to the rule of law?
The policy of the OAU and that of its successor organization, the African
Union (AU), towards military coups and other forms of unconstitutional
change of government can be found in three important documents. The first
instrument is the Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response
to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (Lomé Declaration).479 The second is the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Democracy Charter), which was adopted by the African Union at the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on January
30, 2007 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.480 The third instrument is the Constitutive
Act of the African Union (Constitutive Act), which was signed in Lomé, Togo,
on July 11, 2000.481
The Lomé Declaration outlines four situations that OAU Member States
had agreed could produce an unconstitutional change of government and these
are: (1) military coup d’état against a democratically elected Government; (2)
intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected Government;
(3) replacement of democratically elected Governments by armed dissident
groups and rebel movements; and (4) the refusal by an incumbent government
to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair, and regular elections.482
While the Democracy Charter lists the same four situations that were elaborated in the Lomé Declaration, it provides for a fifth situation, which addresses changes to national constitutions that interfere with constitutional and
democratic change of government: “Any amendment or revision of the
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Id. at 83–84.
Org. of African Unity, Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) (2000) [hereinafter Lomé Declaration].
480
Org. of African Unity, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,
OAU Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.47 (VIII) (2007) [hereinafter Democracy Charter]. The Democracy Charter came into effect on February 15, 2012.
481
Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3.
482
Lomé Declaration, supra note 479, at 3 (emphasis added). The Lomé Declaration,
however, did not address the situation where it was necessary to intervene to replace a nondemocratic government.
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constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles
of democratic change of government.”483
In the context in which the expression is used in this article, a military coup
d’état usually involves the “forceful removal from office of individuals who
hold leadership positions in the polity’s political institutions.”484 A military
coup can also be defined as “an irregular transfer of a state’s chief executive
by the regular armed forces or internal security forces through the use (or
threat) of force” that specifically excludes “nonmilitary irregular transfers
such as cabinet reshufflings and palace coups that lack military participation.”485
Although definitions of military coups d’état may differ, they all have one
thing in common: they constitute an unconstitutional or non-democratic
change of government and hence, represent a threat to the rule of law. In addition, military coups, even if they are bloodless—that is, they do not involve
the loss of life—may unleash a series of actions that could lead to civil war or
some form of violent sectarian conflict that can directly threaten the rule of
law or, at the very least, interfere with the practice of constitutionalism. The
military coup, being an unconstitutional change of government, is a direct
threat to democratic governance and the rule of law, regardless of the intentions of coup leaders.486
483

Democracy Charter, supra note 480, at art. 23(5). This principle implicates what has
been referred to as the constitutional coup, where incumbent presidents change the constitution in order to unconstitutionally extend their stay in power. See generally Mbaku, supra
note 33 (examining the constitutional coup as a threat to democracy in Africa).
484
JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE 92 (1997).
485
See J. Craig Jenkins & Augustine J. Kposowa, Explaining Military Coups d’État:
Black Africa, 1957–1984, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 861, 861 (1990).
486
Recall that since the Egyptian military coup of July 23, 1952, Africa’s coup leaders
have claimed that their actions were motivated by the desire to rid their societies of incompetent and corrupt leaders and restore integrity and professionalism to the government. Yet,
without exception, all of Africa’s military elites who have successfully overthrown their
governments, including members of the Free Officers Movement who overthrew the government of King Farouk in Egypt in 1952, have not performed any better than the civilian
regimes that they ousted. In fact, many of the military elites who have conducted successful
military coups have gone on to establish what turned out to be extremely repressive and
tyrannical regimes that have not only retarded economic development but have also stunted
the deepening and institutionalization of democracy and the practice of constitutionalism.
Perhaps, more important is the fact that it is difficult to find a situation in Africa where
coup leaders successfully transitioned their countries to governance regimes underpinned
by the rule of law. Examples of military regimes that have gone on to stunt political development in their respective countries include the reign of terror unleashed on Nigerians by
military rule (1966–1979, 1993–1999), on the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo
by the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko (1965–1997), who seized power by military coup in
1965, and on inhabitants of Togo by Gnassingbé Eyadéma (1967–2005). See generally JIMI
PETERS, THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND THE STATE (1997) (examining the role of the military
in governance in Nigeria); OLAYIWOLA ABEGUNRIN, NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER
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B. The OAU and the African Union and Efforts to Deal with Military Coups
and Other Threats to the Rule of Law
The OAU was officially disbanded on July 9, 2002 and replaced by the
African Union.487 In this section of the paper we look closer at the position
taken by the OAU and AU with respect to military coups and other unconstitutional changes of government. Since coups are a threat to the rule of law,
this section of the paper will also consider how the OAU and AU have dealt
with their impact on the rule of law in Africa.
Both the Lomé Declaration and the Democracy Charter provide the African Union with a general framework to respond and deal with unconstitutional
changes of government.488 Nevertheless, emphasis is placed on military coups
to the neglect of other situations that produce unconstitutional changes of government, such as “constitutional coups.”489 It has been suggested that during
the founding of the OAU, “many African leaders believed that military coups
were the most pervasive of the four or five forms of extra-constitutional
change of government.”490 Some scholars have argued, however, that some of
Africa’s post-independence leaders, especially those who had come to power
through military coups, were likely to consider the military coup as the most
important threat to the survival of their regimes, much more so than other
forms of unconstitutional change of government.491 Professor Victor T. Le
Vine recognized the threat posed to the rule of law by the military coup when
he stated that “it was the military regimes that epitomized the low state to
which constitutionalism had fallen during [the] 1963–89” period in West Africa.492 As evidenced by recent unconstitutional changes of government in

MILITARY RULE, 1966–1999 (2003) (examining the impact of the military on Nigerian foreign policy); GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, THE CONGO: FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA, A
PEOPLE’S HISTORY (2002) (examining Mobutu’s coup and his more than 30-year brutal
rule); CHUKA ONWUMECHILI, AFRICAN DEMOCRATIZATION AND MILITARY COUPS (1998)
(examining Eyadéma’s coups in Togo and his subsequent domination of Togolese politics
for many years).
487
Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3.
488
See Lomé Declaration, supra note 479; Democracy Charter, supra note 480.
489
Mbaku, supra note 33, at 81.
490
Id. at 87.
491
Id.
492
Le Vine, supra, note 25, at 190.
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Egypt,493 Sudan494 and Zimbabwe,495 the military coup remains a serious
threat to the rule of law in Africa.
At this point in the analysis, one could ask why countries, such as the
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and many of today’s matured
democracies, have managed to escape military coups, despite the fact that they
have extremely strong militaries. The answer to this question lies in the fact
that “all these countries have governing processes undergirded by separation
of powers with effective checks and balances, which include [truly] independent judiciaries, robust civil societies, openness and transparency in government communication, and free and independent media.”496 To preserve the
rule of law or to establish it, each African country must strengthen, deepen
and institutionalize its democracy generally and its democratic institutions in
particular. That calls for institutional reforms that create the type of governing
processes described above.
But, what have been OAU/AU policy responses to military coups and
other challenges to the rule of law? As stated in the Lomé Declaration, during
the Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, delegates “unanimously rejected any unconstitutional
change as an unacceptable and anachronistic act, which is in contradiction of
our commitment to promote democratic principles and conditions.”497 Chapter 8 of the Democracy Charter prescribes sanctions that should be imposed
on African countries and regimes that undertake unconstitutional changes of
government.498 The Lomé Declaration also provides similar sanctions as those
provided in the Democracy Charter.
According to Article 25 of the Democracy Charter, whenever the AU’s
Peace and Security Council determines that there has been “an unconstitutional change of government in a State Party, and that diplomatic initiatives
have failed, it shall suspend the said State Party from the exercise of its right
to participate in the activities of the Union.”499 The suspension of such an

493
See David D. Kirkpatrick, Army Outs Egypt’s President; Morsi Is Taken into Military
Custody, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middlee
ast/egypt.html (examining the military coup that overthrew the democratically-elected government of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt).
494
See Sudan Coup: Why Omar al-Bashir Was Overthrown, supra note 34 (examining
the 2019 military coup that ousted the regime of al-Bashir in Sudan).
495
See Tinashe Kairiza & Chipa Gonditii, It Was a Military Coup: Obasanjo, ZIMBABWE
INDEP. (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2019/03/29/it-was-a-militarycoup-obasanjo/ (examining the military coup that overthrew the government of Robert Gabriel Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 2017).
496
See Mbaku, supra note 33, at 87.
497
Lomé Declaration, supra note 479.
498
Democracy Charter, supra note 480, at ch. 8.
499
Id. at art. 25(1).
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offending State Party is expected to “take effect immediately.”500 With respect
to the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change of government (e.g., the military elites who organized and carried out the coup), they are permanently
banned from participating “in elections held to restore the democratic order or
hold any position of responsibility in political institutions of their State.”501 In
addition, “[p]erpetrators of unconstitutional change of government may also
be tried before the competent court of the Union.”502 Other sanctions are prescribed for Member States and perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government. According to Article 25(7), “[t]he Assembly [of AU Heads of State
and Government] may decide to apply other forms of sanctions on perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government including punitive economic
measures.”503
But, how have the OAU and the AU performed in their efforts to deal with
unconstitutional change of government? Although Article 25 of the Democracy Charter prohibits any individuals who have participated in an unconstitutional change of government (e.g., a military coup) from “democratizing”
themselves and becoming part of the post-coup civilian government, the OAU
and the African Union have often not imposed sanctions on individuals who
have done so and the regimes that they have subsequently formed. For example, in 1979, then Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings of the Ghana Air Force,
attempted but failed to overthrow the regime of [General] Fred Akuffo.504
Rawlings was arrested by the Ghanaian military, tried and sentenced to death
for the abortive coup.505
However, during his court martial, Rawlings made declarations that endeared him to the Ghanaian public, especially those who were sick and tired
of the country’s “corruption and social injustices under the SMC506

500

Id.
Id. at art. 25(4).
502
Id. at art. 25(5).
503
Id. at art. 25(7).
504
See Ghana: What Will Rawlings Do?, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL (June 20, 1979), https://ww
w.africa-confidential.com/special-report/id/26/What_will_Rawlings_do; see also Leon
Dash, Jerry Rawlings Again Leads Military Seizure of Power in Ghana, WASH. POST (Jan,
1, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/01/jerry-rawlings-ag
ain-leads-military-seizure-of-power-in-ghana/47ebae98-3354-4e0e-81b9-cc9722e1a3bb/
(noting the overthrow of the government of Ghana by former Air Force officer Jerry Rawlings).
505
See DAVID AFRIYIE DONKOR, SPIDERS OF THE MARKET: GHANAIAN TRICKSTER
PERFORMANCE IN A WEB OF NEOLIBERALISM 39 (2016) (examining Jerry Rawlings’ trial for
treason in Ghana); see also Nugent, infra note 510 (noting the trial of Rawlings for the
failed coup against the government of General Akuffo in May 1979).
506
That is the regime of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which lasted from October
9, 1975 to June 4, 1979. See October 9, 1975, Supreme Military Council is Formed,
EDWARD A. ULZEN MEM’L FOUND. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.eaumf.org/ejm-blog/2017/
501
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regime.”507 At this time in the country’s history, many citizens of Ghana had
come to associate the military and military rulers with “misrule and embezzlement than with courage and integrity.”508 On the other hand, they considered Rawlings a man of “courage and integrity” and hence, throughout his
trial, the capital city was littered with posters with phrases, such as, “leave
Rawlings alone,” “Rawlings is our man,” and “revolution or death.”509 On
June 4, 1979, a group of soldiers, claiming that Ghana’s existing leadership
was extremely corrupt, dysfunctional, and no longer able to effectively lead
the country, attacked the military barracks where Rawlings was awaiting execution and freed him. Rawlings subsequently led the group of soldiers that
had freed him in a bloody coup that ousted the SMC and the Akuffo government.510
Shortly after the coup, Rawlings, who had been sprung from jail by junior
officers, was made head of the fifteen-member Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC), “which was an instrument of junior [military] officers and
the lower ranks.”511 The AFRC, nevertheless, allowed the presidential elections that were scheduled for July 9, 1979 to proceed. They were won by
“Hilla Limann’s People’s National Party (PNP)” and on September 24, 1979,
Rawlings “formally handed over to Limman and returned to the barracks.”512
Rawlings, however, grew increasingly interested in politics and “began to
hang out at the campus of the University of Ghana where there was a
10/9/hse5813sxku8rlsgzd76wu1ukgs0ps (noting that Ghana’s Supreme Military Council
was formed on October 9, 1975 and disbanded on June 4, 1979); see also Eboe Hutchful,
Miliary Policy and Reform in Ghana, 35 J. MOD. AFRI. STUD. 251, 251 (1997) (noting that
Ghana’s Supreme Military Council was terminated by military coup d’état on June 4, 1979
and replaced by “the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) headed by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings”).
507
The SMC was led by Col. I. K. Acheampong (October 7, 1975 to July 5, 1978) and
General Fred Akuffo (July 5, 1978 to June 4, 1979). See, e.g., MICHAEL S. ASANTE,
DEFORESTATION IN GHANA: EXPLAINING THE CHRONIC FAILURE OF FOREST PRESERVATION
POLICIES IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY 130 (2005) (examining the role of the SMC regime
in political economy in Ghana).
508
Id. at 39.
509
Id.
510
See ALEX EKE, KLEPTOCRACY: AFRICAN STYLE 45 (2018); see also Pranay Gupte, ExOfficer Outs Ghana’s Government Again, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 1982), https://www.nytimes.
com/1982/01/01/world/ex-officer-ousts-ghana-s-government-again.html (noting that
Rawlings, who had been put in jail for his failed attempt to overthrow the regime of Lieutenant General Frederick Akuffo, “was freed by fellow officers and quickly took charge of
the [Akuffo] Government”); Paul Nugent, Nkrumah and Rawlings: Political Lives in Parallel?, 12 TRANSACTIONS OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF GHANA, NEW SERIES 35, 50
(2009–2010) (noting that Rawlings was “sprung from jail and brought to head the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)” after the second coup, which took place on June
4, 1979, was successful).
511
See Nugent, supra note 510, at 50.
512
See id.; see also TAPAN PRASAD BISWAL, GHANA: POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS 185 (1992).
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substantial body of leftwing intellectuals who helped him to give greater shape
to his raw gut-feelings.”513 On September 24, 1979, power was peacefully
handed over to President Hilla Limann of the People’s National Party
(PNP).514 However, Rawlings, convinced that the Limann regime did not have
the capacity and political will to deal effectively with the country’s multifarious economic and political problems, overthrew the government on December
31, 1981.515
Shortly after the overthrow of Limann, Rawlings constituted the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) as the country’s ruling body with
him as the head.516 Rawlings’ PNDC drafted a new constitution, which was
subsequently approved by referendum on April 28, 1992.517 That year, Rawlings resigned from the military and together with the PNDC and its supporters,
founded a political party called the National Democratic Congress (NDC).518
He subsequently participated in and won the presidential elections that were
held on November 3, 1992 and assumed the position of President of Ghana’s
Fourth Republic.519
The OAU, however, did not condemn Rawlings’s participation in the postcoup democratic dispensation, nor did it suspend Ghana’s participation in its
activities.520 Of course, one can argue that the decision by Rawlings to resign
from the army and engage in civilian politics was undertaken before the OAU
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See Nugent, supra note 510, at 50.
See id. at 51; see also Jeff Haynes, Human Rights and Democracy in Ghana: The
Record of the Rawlings’ Regime, 90 AFR. AFF. 407, 408 (1991); RUTH NORA CYR,
TWENTIETH CENTURY AFRICA 209, 219 (2001) (examining President Hilmann’s regime in
Ghana).
515
See CARLSON ANYANGWE, REVOLUTIONARY OVERTHROW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDERS IN AFRICA 144 (2012) (examining military coups in Africa, including the overthrow of the government of Limann by Rawlings).
516
See David Abdulai, Rawlings ‘Wins’ Ghana’s Presidential Elections: Establishing a
New Constitutional Order, 39 AFR. TODAY 66, 66 (1992).
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U.S. Dep’t of State, State Department Issues Background Note on Ghana, U.S. FED
NEWS (Apr. 1, 2008) (noting that on April 28, 1992, Ghana held a national referendum to
approve a new constitution and that “[o]n May 18, 1992, the ban on party politics was lifted
in preparation for multi-party elections”).
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Id. (noting that the “PNDC and its supporters formed a new party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), to contest the elections”).
519
See OBED YAO ASAMOAH, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF GHANA (1950–2013): THE
EXPERIENCE OF A NON-CONFORMIST 440 (2014) (examining Rawlings’s ascent to the presidency of the Republic of Ghana); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 517 (noting that
Rawlings won presidential elections held on November 3, 1992 and was inaugurated as
President of Ghana on January 7, 1993); Abdulai, supra note 516, at 66–67 (noting that
“presidential and parliamentary elections were [held in Ghana] on November 3 and December 8, 1992 respectively”).
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Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups d’État,
44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123, 126 (2011).
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and AU adopted the three documents related to unconstitutional change of
government.521
The OAU was founded in 1963 and it was not until the mid-1990s that the
organization began to seriously consider adopting a continent-wide uniform
policy for dealing with unconstitutional change of government, including military coups.522 Eki Yemisi Omorogbe states that “[t]he turning point”523 in the
OAU’s attitude towards military coups and other forms of unconstitutional
regime change came after the overthrow of the democratically-elected government of Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone.524 Kabbah was elected president of
Sierra Leone as part of the post-war reconstruction process.525 However, on
May 25, 1997, his government was overthrown by Major Johnny Paul
Koromah.526 When the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government
met in Harare, Zimbabwe, during the period May 28–31, 1997, delegates addressed the coup in Sierra Leone, called for a return to “constitutional government” and “encouraged the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to achieve that goal.”527 Delegates at the Harare summit “strongly
and unequivocally” condemned the military coup d’état “which took place in
Sierra Leone on 25 May, 1997” and called for the “immediate restoration of
constitutional order.”528 Finally, the delegates called on all African countries
and the international community not to recognize the new regime and to refrain from “lending support in any form whatsoever to the perpetrators of the
coup d’état.”529
The military government of Koromah, however, was ousted in February
1998 by an ECOWAS military force named ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) and Kabbah’s regime was restored.530 This time, it appears, the OAU, working with the regional group,
ECOWAS, had succeeded in restoring constitutional government after
521

That is the Lomé Declaration (2000), the Democracy Charter (2007), and the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000).
522
Omorogbe, supra note 520, at 125–126.
523
Id. at 127.
524
Id.
525
Id.
526
Id. See generally JOHN L. HIRSCH, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY 51 (2001) (providing background information on the military coup that overthrew the government of Tejan Kabbah in Sierra Leone in 1997).
527
Omorogbe, supra note 520, at 127; see also Org. of African Unity Council of Ministers, Decisions Adopted by the Sixty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers,
DOC. CM/2004 (LXVI)-C (May 28–31, 1997), https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9
622-council_en_28_31_may_1997_council_ministers_sixty_sixth_ordinary_session.pdf
(condemning the 1997 coup in Sierra Leone and appealing to the international community
to restore constitutional order there).
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Omorogbe, supra note 520, at 127.
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military intervention. The OAU then turned to situations in Comoros, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea Bissau, and Niger, where there had been
military coups since the Harare summit and declared that all these countries
should restore “constitutional legality before the [2000] Summit.”531
In Lomé, Togo, in July 2000, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government adopted the first of three instruments that were designed specifically to deal with unconstitutional change of government—the Declaration
on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government.532 As argued by Mbaku, “[t]he events in Sierra Leone, thus, provided
the impetus to the unequivocal condemnation and rejection of the military
coup and other forms of unconstitutional regime changes on the continent.”533
There have been arguments that some military coups are actually good and
that they can rid a country of recalcitrant, corrupt, opportunistic, tyrannical,
and dysfunctional regimes. For example, Paul Colier, a well-known economist who studies African political economy, has argued that “[a] truly bad
government in a developing country is more likely to be replaced by a coup
than by an election.”534 However, the idea or proposition that “some coups are
acceptable, and therefore could be said to be good coups, whereas others are
not acceptable, and are therefore bad coups,” poses a lot of challenges to anyone interested in eliminating threats to the rule of law in the continent. First,
most of the post-coup regimes that have been established in African countries
during the last several decades have generally been opportunistic and have
failed to successfully transition their countries to constitutional government
and the rule of law.535 Second, many of Africa’s military coups have stunted

531
Org. of African Unity Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Declarations and
Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Fifth Assembly of Heads of State and Government,
AHG/Decl. 1–2 (XXXV), at 24 (July 12-14, 1999), https://archives.au.int/handle/1234567
89/770. Note that the coup in Comoros took place in 1999, that in Congo (Brazzaville) in
1997, those in Guinea-Bissau in 1998 and 1999, and those in Niger in 1998 and 1999.
Omorogbe, supra note 520, at 127 n. 27.
532
See Lomé Declaration, supra note 479.
533
Mbaku, supra note 33, at 93.
534
Paul Colier, Let Us Now Praise Coups, WASH. POST (June 22, 2008), http://www.was
hingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/19/AR2008061901429.html.
535
Examples include the military regime of Mobutu Sese Seko, which came to power in
the DRC in 1965 and dominated the country’s political economy for more than three decades (1965–1997) and during that time, made no effort to transition the country to constitutional government; the military regime that took power in Nigeria in 1967 and went on
to impose a reign of terror on Nigerians that lasted until 1999; the military regime of
Gnassingbé Eyadéma, which came into being in Togo in 1967 and lasted for nearly four
decades, effectively stunting the development of constitutionalism in the country, etc. See
generally NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 486 (examining Mobutu’s tyrannous reign in
the Democratic Republic of Congo); A. B. ASSENSOH & YVETTE M. ALEX-ASSENSOH,
AFRICAN MILITARY HISTORY AND POLITICS: COUPS AND IDEOLOGICAL INCURSIONS, 1900–
PRESENT (2001) (examining Eyadéma’s coup and his subsequent domination of Togolese
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the potential of many countries to develop constitutional governments—in
fact, many of these continue to suffer today from the damage done to them by
military coups and have not been able to establish and sustain rule of law regimes. These countries include Algeria, Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe.536
Naison Ngoma has argued that although the “military has a certain contribution to make towards the development of a state, this contribution has not
always been successful.”537 In fact, military intervention in African politics
has not only failed to improve governance in Africa but has actually stunted
the development of governing processes undergirded by the rule of law.538
Since “unconstitutional regime changes have usually led to or produced unconstitutional regimes, . . . military coups and other unconstitutional approaches to regime change cannot lead to the deepening and institutionalization of democracy” in Africa.539
Despite the African Union’s uniform policy on unconstitutional change of
government, the continental organization has not always provided a uniform
response to situations involving military coups and other forms of unconstitutional regime change. Granted, the OAU acted firmly to restore democracy in
Sierra Leone after the military coup that overthrew the government of Tejan
Kabbah in 1997.540 Nevertheless, when, for example, Joseph Kabila refused
to step down after his term as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo
had ended, the AU did not impose sanctions on him and his regime.541 Kabila
came to power in the DRC after the assassination of his father, Laurent-Désiré
Kabila, who had overthrown the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko and taken control of the government.542 He was subsequently elected president in 2006 and
re-elected in 2011 for a second and final term that was supposed to expire on
December 19, 2016.543

political economy for nearly four decades); ABEGUNRIN, supra note 486 (examining the
impact of Nigeria’s various military regimes on the country’s political economy).
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See generally ONWUMECHILI, supra note 486 (examining the impact of military coups
on democratization in Africa).
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Mbaku, supra note 33, at 97.
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See John Mukum Mbaku, The Postponed DRC Elections: Behind the Tumultuous Politics, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2
016/11/18/the-postponed-drc-elections-behind-the-tumultuous-politics/.
542
Id.
543
Id.

378

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L

[Vol. 48:293

The DRC scheduled presidential elections for November 27, 2016 to select
a successor to Joseph Kabila. However, before the elections could take place,
the country’s electoral authority (Commission électorale nationale indépendante—CENI), which was controlled by Kabila’s government, postponed the
elections, arguing that the country did not have enough money to carry out a
credible election and that it did not have an accurate electoral register.544 Kabila effectively manipulated the country’s national institutions to unconstitutionally extend his presidential mandate for over two years.545 Yet, the AU did
not impose any sanctions on Kabila and his unconstitutional behavior.
On July 4, 2013, the Egyptian military overthrew the democraticallyelected government of Mohamed Morsi.546 The military coup was led by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi who went on to become the 6th President of Egypt.547
The AU initially condemned the coup as “an unconstitutional change of government and subsequently suspended Egypt’s participation in AU activities.”548 However, after a presidential election was held between May 26 and
28, 2014, which resulted in the election of el-Sisi as president, the AU lifted
the suspension. By doing so, the AU failed to apply Article 25(4) of the Democracy Charter, which states that “[t]he perpetrators of unconstitutional
change of government shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to
restore the democratic order or hold any position of responsibility in political
institutions of their State.”549
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who had participated in the post-coup presidential
election as a candidate for the presidency, was the leader of the military coup
that overthrew a democratically-elected government. As required by AU principles, el-Sisi should have been sanctioned for participating in post-coup elections designed to restore democratic order and for holding a position of responsibility in the government.550 As argued by Mbaku, “[t]he decision by the
AU to recognize [el-Sisi’s] government and lift Egypt’s suspension significantly undermined the AU’s legitimacy and ability to consistently deal with
unconstitutional changes of government”551 and promote the rule of law in the
continent.
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As if to confirm how toothless and dysfunctional the AU has become, especially when it comes to the enforcement of its own directives, at the AU
Summit in Addis Ababa on February 10, 2019, delegates elected el-Sisi Chairman of the African Union.552 Human rights groups, including Amnesty International, condemned the elevation of el-Sisi to the chairmanship of the AU
and noted that “[d]uring his time in power President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has
demonstrated a shocking contempt for human rights. Under his leadership the
country has undergone a catastrophic decline in rights and freedoms.”553
Earlier, this article discussed the constitutional coup as a major constraint
to constitutionalism and the rule of law in Africa. Even though the AU has
recognized the constitutional coup as a situation constituting an unconstitutional change of government, it has never imposed sanctions on individuals
who have engaged in such behaviors or the governmental regimes formed by
them. Article 23(5) of the Democracy Charter states as follows:
State Parties agree that the use of, inter alia, the following illegal means of accessing or maintaining power constitute an
unconstitutional change of government and shall draw appropriate sanctions of the Union: 5. Any amendment or revision
of the constitution or legal instruments, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.554
Take, for example, the case of President Paul Biya of Cameroon. He became President of the Republic of Cameroon on November 6, 1982 when the
country’s first president voluntarily resigned the office.555 At the time, Biya
was the country’s Prime Minister and succeeded Ahidjo as required by the
country’s constitution.556 On December 19, 1990, Biya formally legalized
multiparty politics in Cameroon.557 The first presidential election after multiparty politics were legalized took place on October 11, 1992 and Biya
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emerged victorious to serve a five-year term as president.558 He won re-election in 1997.559
However, Cameroon’s constitution was amended in 1996, introducing
term limits for presidents—the president was limited to two seven-year
terms.560 Thus, if Biya was successfully re-elected in the presidential election
scheduled for October 11, 2004, he was constitutionally required to leave office at the end of his mandate in 2011. Any effort by him to change the constitution and stay in the office beyond 2011 would have constituted a violation
of Article 23(5) of the AU’s Democracy Charter since that would have been
a “revision of the constitution . . . which is an infringement on the principles
of democratic change of government.”561 The AU, then, would have been required, as mandated by the Democracy Charter and other instruments, to impose sanctions on Biya and his regime.
In 2008 and in anticipation of the presidential election scheduled for October 9, 2011, Biya had the constitution changed so that he could run for another term in office.562 This was a direct violation of the provisions of Article
23(5) of the Democracy Charter. Yet, the AU neither condemned the action
nor imposed any sanctions on Biya and his regime. Biya continued his legal
manipulations to stay in office and in 2018, he won re-election for another
seven-year term and will potentially remain in office until 2025.563
With the help of the constitutional coup, Biya has been able to remain in
power indefinitely and in the process, he has stunted Cameroon’s transition to
democratic governance and the rule of law. Many scholars of Cameroon political economy have termed the regime of Paul Biya “illegitimate [and]
rights-abusive” and commented that even though the country is “technically a
multiparty democracy, the reality is far from democratic.”564 Others have included him among the world’s most enduring dictators.565
Other African presidents who have used constitutional coups to frustrate
their countries’ transitions to governing processes undergirded by the rule of
558
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law include: Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, who has been in power since 1986
and has changed the constitution to eliminate both term and age limits for
presidents;566 Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi, who had the constitution
changed in 2018 allowing him to potentially remain in office until 2034;567
Iddris Déby of Chad, who engineered a 2018 constitutional amendment that
could allow him to stay in power until 2033;568 Paul Kagame of Rwanda, who
amended the constitution in 2015 to allow himself to potentially remain in
office until 2034;569 and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who ruled Algeria from 1999
until he was ousted by a popular revolt in April 2019.570 All these presidents
used constitutional coups to extend their mandates and in doing so, effectively
stunted efforts to develop and sustain a governing process undergirded by adherence to the rule of law.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Recent studies show that extreme poverty continues to plague many African countries and that countries, like Nigeria, which are endowed with
566
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significant amounts of natural resources, including oil and gas, have large
populations of people living in extreme poverty.571 In fact, despite its oil
wealth, Nigeria has surpassed India as the country with the largest number of
people living in extreme poverty.572
Many scholars have studied the causes of poverty and underdevelopment
in Africa. Some of these studies have concluded that persistent poverty in the
continent can be attributed to several factors, including “pervasive military
intervention in governance; natural disasters; excessive and unmanageable
population growth; political violence and destructive ethnic conflict; dependence on the industrial West for development assistance, food aid and loans;
political and bureaucratic corruption; and excessive exploitation of the continent’s environmental resources.”573 In addition, it has also been argued that
pervasive poverty in the continent can be blamed on “policy mistakes made
by well-meaning but incompetent and ill-informed policymakers.”574
Over the years, many development economists and other scholars of African political economy have suggested that the most effective way to eradicate
poverty in Africa and improve human development is for each country to
bring into its governance system “more competent, better trained, honest,
highly ethical and disciplined individuals” in an effort to “reduce public malfeasance and venality, increase bureaucratic efficiency, and improve governance and the allocation of resources.”575 Nevertheless, many of these recommendations were considered questionable because even countries that had
made a concerted effort to significantly improve their civil services remain
pervaded with corruption and were still unable to create the wealth that they
need to fight poverty.
However, in 1996, economist Mancur Olson published a seminal paper in
which he argued that natural resource endowments, as well as the availability
of a highly-educated and skilled workforce, were not a necessary precondition
for development.576 Olson went on to argue that it is the quality of a country’s
institutions and its public policies that are critical to economic growth and
development.577 As has been determined by other scholars, the poor economic
performance and the failure of many African countries to deal fully and
571
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effectively with poverty is due to the existence, in these countries, of extremely weak and dysfunctional institutions.578
It is true that African policymakers and civil servants have made their share
of mistakes. However, all available evidence points to political opportunism
on the part of civil servants and political elites as the most important explanation for continued poverty in the continent.579 In fact, many of Africa’s postindependence leaders have actually promoted policies that have enriched them
but have impoverished their fellow citizens.580 In research published in 2004,
Rod Alence determined that “democratic institutions systematically enhance
African states’ performance as agents of development.”581 In a recent study
on the relationship between the rule of law and development in Africa, Joseph
Isanga argues that “Africa’s economic growth needs to be premised on the
intrinsic and inseparable relationship and synergy between rule of law and
sustainable economic growth, a proposition that African law and judicial institutions are not properly recognizing.”582 He concludes that in order for African countries to achieve sustainable economic and human development, it is
necessary that each country “continue to develop institutions dedicated to
good governance and the rule of law.”583 N. A. Curott argues that:
The Rule of Law, by providing the framework for protecting
private property and individual freedom, creates the stability
and predictability in economic affairs necessary to promote
entrepreneurship, saving and investment, and capital formation. It is nonsensical to expect . . . economic development
in Africa without addressing the institutional factors, such as
the lack of Rule of Law, which are responsible for Africa’s failure to develop in the first place.584
A 2012 declaration by the High-level Meeting of the [UN] General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels (UNGA
Declaration) stated that:
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[T]he rule of law and development are strongly interrelated
and mutually reinforcing, that the advancement of the rule of
law at the national and international levels is essential for sustained and inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full realization of all human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the right to development, all of which in turn reinforce the rule of law, and for this reason we are convinced that
this interrelationship should be considered in the post-2015 international development agenda.585
The UNGA Declaration went on to state that “[w]e recognize the importance of fair, stable and predictable legal frameworks for generating inclusive, sustainable and equitable development, economic growth and employment, generating investment and facilitating entrepreneurship.”586 It is now
generally agreed by many scholars of development that it is very difficult and
virtually impossible to advance inclusive economic growth and development
in a country in which the majority of citizens do not voluntarily accept and
respect the law. It has been argued that the failure to effectively manage ethnocultural diversity is a major threat to peace and security in Africa.587 The
solution lies in providing each African country with governing processes that
deal effectively with the challenges posed by ethnocultural diversity—such a
governing process would prevent majoritarian tyranny and allow each subculture to maximize its values without preventing others from acting similarly.
Such a governing process is one that is undergirded by the rule of law. Hence,
making certain that the rule of law functions effectively in each African country is the key to peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in the continent.588
Although the rule of law “is a critical catalyst to Africa’s effort to deal
effectively with poverty,”589 many countries on the continent are presently
unable to provide themselves with an effective rule-of-law regime. This is due
to several challenges, some of which have been examined in this article. These
challenges include, but are not limited to, government impunity, military intervention in governance, manipulation of national constitutions by presidents
in order to remain in power indefinitely, political interference with the judiciary or lack of judicial independence, failure of the majority of citizens in each
585
G.A. Res. 67/1, Declaration of the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on
the Rule of Law at the National and International Level, ¶ 7 (Nov. 30, 2012).
586
Id. at ¶ 8.
587
See, e.g., MBAKU, supra note 61, at 1 (arguing that the failure to fully and effectively
manage ethnocultural diversity is a major constraint to economic growth and development
in Africa).
588
Id. at 290–296.
589
Mbaku, supra note 60, at 1051.

2020]

THREATS TO THE RULE OF LAW IN AFRICA

385

African country to understand and appreciate the constitution and its role in
their lives, failure to domesticate international human rights instruments, and
extreme poverty and political and economic exclusion. These threats to the
rule of law can only be eliminated through democratic (inclusive, participatory, bottom-up, and people-driven) constitution-making that produces constitutions and governing processes undergirded by separation of powers with
checks and balances. The latter must include a truly independent judiciary, a
bicameral legislature, with each chamber empowered to exercise an absolute
veto over legislation passed by the other; and an independent and competent
executive. Considering the important role played by civil society and its organizations in checking the exercise of government power, the governing process must be one that guarantees openness and transparency in government
communication so that civil society and its organizations (e.g., a free and independent press) can have relatively easy access to the information that they
need to check the government.

